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by source-country, spanning the period between 1997 and 2011. I study whether the presence of 
established importers located in the same area and/or operating in the same industry influences the import 
behavior of individual firms. The import side of trade has received relatively less attention in the literature 
and this tendency carries over to the study of spillovers that have mainly been researched from the 
exporters' perspective. There are however reasons to believe that import spillovers are indeed a relevant 
phenomenon. This paper bridges the gap in the literature and further contributes to the understanding of 
import spillovers by laying out a theoretical framework that formalizes the main forces at play. I develop a 
model for firms' import decisions featuring heterogeneous firms, product and country specific fixed 
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1 Introduction:
A well known finding in the ”new new” trade literature is that firm characteristics matter for firms’ par-
ticipation in international activities. Both exporting as well as importing involve significant fixed entry
costs that only the most productive firms can afford to incur.
A significant part of the costs associated with importing can be thought of as informational transaction
costs. These include inter alia costs related to acquiring information about the availability, prices and
quality of foreign intermediates, the specific technical characteristics of these goods and their compati-
bility with domestic regulations but also with the the firm’s production process and its workers’ skills;
identifying potential suppliers and verifying their credentials as well as familiarizing with a different
business environment and the conditions of contract enforcement in a foreign country. In Appendix 6 I
summarize in more detail the difficulties faced by Swedish importers as they are presented in a survey
conducted by the Kommerskolegium1. In the same Appendix, I also cite the difficulties of international
sourcing as they have been identified by other national authorities, like the Canadian Board of Trade and
the respective services of the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland.
This paper, explores whether the presence of established importers located in the same area and/or op-
erating in the same industry influences the import decisions of Swedish manufacturing firms. I build
on the idea that the agglomeration of importers in a certain region/industry may generate important
information that can be accessible by other firms in the region/industry, lowering the fixed costs related
to sourcing inputs from abroad and hence facilitating their decision to follow suit.
The import side of trade has received relatively less attention in the literature and this tendency carries
over to the study of spillovers. The effect of peers located in the same region or operating in the same
industry on firms’ international decisions has mainly been studied in an empirical framework and from
the exporter’s perspective2. There are however reasons to believe that import spillovers are indeed a
relevant phenomenon that should be explored more.
The export bias in the trade literature is at odds with the preponderance of trade in intermediates in
global trade flows. Indeed, trade in intermediates has grown to be a salient part of global trade, repre-
senting more than half of the global trade volume. Fully understanding the determinants of the decision
to import intermediates from abroad as well as the mechanisms that facilitate international sourcing is
interesting from a policy perspective since trade in intermediates is known to be a vehicle of knowledge
transfers across the borders. In addition, access to a wider variety of intermediates or to intermediates
of higher quality is known to translate into productivity gains for firms as documented in Halpren et
al. (2015) but also Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Kasahara and Lapham (2012) etc. In a recent paper
Boler et al., 2014 provide evidence that R&D and international sourcing are complementary activities.
Policy makers have long prioritized export promotion. Thereby, as opposed to gathering information
related to exporting activities, public interventions are rare in the case of importing. As a result, infor-
1The Swedish National Board of Trade
2The literature on export spillovers has been developed among others by Aitken et al. (1997), Greenaway and Kneller
(2008), Koenig (2009), Koenig et al. (2010), Karpaty and Kneller (2010), Andersson and Weiss (2012), Bernard and Jensen
(2004), Barrios et al. (2003) etc. but also Krautheim (2013) and Rauch and Watson (2003) on the theoretical side.
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mal informational transfers across firms may be an important channel for lowering the cost of entry into
international markets for intermediates.
This paper bridges the gap in the literature providing support for the existence and going further in devel-
oping an understanding of import spillovers. Having access to a more comprehensive data set (presented
right below) I am able to look at a broader set of questions compared to Lopez and Yadav, 2010 (the
only other paper on import spillovers) and provide insights not only on the existence of import spillovers
but also detail their nature and the mechanisms through which they operate..
I further contribute to the understanding of import spillovers by laying out a theoretical framework that
formalizes the main forces at play. The main challenge is that as opposed to exporting, international
sourcing affects the firm’s marginal cost of production. In the presence of heterogeneous fixed costs (ei-
ther country and/or product specific) the theory features no general predictions for the extensive margin
of importing. The reason is that import decisions feature interdependencies that in turn arise from the
interdependencies between the different inputs in the firms’ production process. Hence, contrary to the
general approach in the exporting literature, firms’ entry decisions in the case of importing cannot be
viewed in isolation by default.
The particularities of modeling the import decision have been formalized in two recent papers by Antras,
Fort and, Tintelnot (2014) and Blaum, Lelarge and, Peters (2013) that are further discussed in Section,
5. I build on these two frameworks and draw the modeling of spillovers from Krautheim, 2012. I derive
a sharp characterization of the firm’s extensive margin (defined here in terms of the firm’s product and
market specific import decision) in the presence of spillover effects, under restrictions for parameter values
that allow me to treat different sourcing decisions as independent. This result (Equation 19), forms the
theoretical basis of the estimation process. I then depart from this ”knife-edge” case and establish more
general results for the interaction of spillover effects and international sourcing decisions to be explored
further in the future.
The empirical analysis is based on an exceptionally detailed dataset of the universe of Swedish firms pro-
viding information on imports at the product, firm and country of origin level for the period 1998-2011. I
investigate whether the individual decision to start importing a specific product and source market com-
bination (i.e. intermediate variety) is influenced by the presence of nearby importers (spillover variables)
controlling for a variety of observed and unobserved heterogeneity. Several definitions of spillovers are
considered in order to explore different dimensions of the variety-specific import decisions and different
channels of information diffusion.
The study of spillovers is in general challenging from an econometric point of view. Being aware of all
the limitations and given the lack of a truly exogenous variation, endogeneity concerns are meticulously
addressed by introducing relevant controls and a rich set of fixed and year effects. I find support for a
mechanism of import spillovers. Results survive the inclusion of more rigorous fixed and year effects and
a series of further robustness checks. While being exposed to the identification concerns that are inherent
to this literature, I believe I come as close to providing evidence on import spillovers as possible.
2
In more detail, I find that the nature of import spillovers is specific to the product and the source market.
Moreover, I find evidence of spillovers both at the regional but also at the sectoral level suggesting that
the mechanism is not only locally bounded but also transmitted through intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral
channels. A potentially interesting reading of this finding is that among all the other benefits (detailed
by Porter, 1998) arising from being located close to other firms in the same industry, is the easier access
to imported intermediates. Intra-industry spillovers are reinforced by physical proximity, suggesting that
learning from competitors’ importing activities is facilitated when they are geographically close and hence
directly observable. Firms seem to be influenced more by neighbors that are similar in organizational
form, ownership type and nationality. More productive same variety importers in the region weigh more
in firms’ individual import decisions. Spillovers exhibit spatial decay and they seem to matter more for
less obvious source-markets.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, describes the data and the operations
that lead to my working data set. In Section 3, I detail the empirical strategy, discuss the caveats and
the ways to deal with estimation concerns as well as the construction of the spillover variables. Section
4 presents the results of the estimation and Section 5 lays out the theoretical motivation and Section 6
concludes.
2 The Data:
In this section I provide a general, high level overview of the data set. A more detailed description and
the reasoning behind the cleaning, restrictions and other operations performed to obtain the working
data are detailed in the Data Appendix, (A.1).
The estimation process utilizes an exceptionally detailed data set supplied by Statistics Sweden (S.C.B.)
covering all active firms in the Firms’ Registry and spanning the period from 1997-2011. The data set
provides information about each firm’s unique identifier (as well as the unique identifier of its subunits),
its location at the finest administrative level i.e. the municipality3, information on firm characteristics
(industry classification, ownership category, legal form, international ownership etc.) and firm perfor-
mance measures (number of employees, value of output produced, net value added, labour costs, input
costs etc.) offering a large pool of available controls.
The data also contains information on firms’ international activities specifying the traded product codes4
and source/destination markets. Note however that the data does not allow me to observe purchases of
domestic intermediates at the product level neither purchases of imported intermediates from wholesalers
since these transactions are bundled as input costs in the firms’ balance sheets data. This is not posing
problems as I am focusing on the effect of neighbors on direct intermediate imports rather than on inter-
3Kommun
4Product classification follows the Combined Nomenclature of the European Union (CN8), which integrates the HS
nomenclature (i.e. the Harmonized System consisting of 5,000 distinct product categories identified by 6-digit codes) and
comprises additional 8-digit subdivisions. I round up the product codes to a 4-digit nomenclature which is sufficiently
detailed and more stable. I am left with 1250 distinct codes down from 13937
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mediate input adoption in general5.
Using this rather rich data set, I am able to address a broad set of questions and examine the role of
spillover effects on different dimensions of the import decision of individual firms but also perform several
robustness checks that strengthen my results. 6.
As the research question is to investigate spillover effects on firms’ import demand for intermediate inputs,
the analysis focuses on manufacturing firms only, and on product codes corresponding to broad economic
classification categories (BEC) 2 and 4 (i.e. industrial supplies and capital goods). Manufacturing firms
represent 7.3% of the firms in the Registry data, whereas after dropping products not falling within the
two aforementioned categories I am left with 891 unique product codes (down from 1250).
For reasons further detailed in the Data Appendix, I concentrate on the import decisions of single-plant,
Swedish-owned firms, which represent 99.4% and 97.3% of the firms in the data respectively. I observe
the import histories of approximately 10,850 firms.7 between 1997 and 2011. Swedish firms in my data
import 847 distinct product codes from 153 source markets, or 15,682 distinct intermediate varieties.
Table A provides insights of the patterns in the import behavior of Swedish firms. In line with other stud-
ies, this table illustrates that the import activity of Swedish firms is highly concentrated geographically,
in the product space but also at the firm level. The median country is only involved in 42 firm-product
cells but the top 1% of Sweden’s trade partners are present in 5,824 distinct firm-product cells. Half
the imported product codes are only present in 46 firm-country cells but the most intensively sourced
products are active in more than 538 firm-country combinations.
Import activity is also highly concentrated at the firm level with the median firm sourcing only 4 inter-
mediate varieties (product-country combinations) per year but the most active firms sourcing more than
54 varieties per year8. Similarly, three quarters of importing firms in Sweden import varieties that worth
around 4% of the highest value firm-product-country combinations. These results should not be viewed
as a oddity of the Swedish data. The fact that only few firms engage in international sourcing and that
the big bulk of importers only source a handful of products from a handful of source markets confirms
the findings of Blaum et al., 2014 for French firms and Gopinath and Neiman, 2012 for Argentinian firms.
The last four rows of the table indicate that there is also considerable heterogeneity in Swedish firms’
sourcing behavior at the extensive margin. Around half the firms that import intermediates at some
point in my data, import from only one market, and only import one product code. The top 1% sources
from as many as 17 distinct markets more than 30 different product codes. There is also significant het-
erogeneity and concentration along the variety margin. Around half the firms source each intermediate
from a single source market but the top 1% of the most geographically diverse sourcing firms import
more than 7 varieties per product. In the same vein, 75% of importers source at most 3 product codes
5The fixed costs associated with directly importing intermediates from abroad are arguably higher and hence spillovers
more relevant.
6Having access to a more comprehensive data set I am able to look at a broader set of questions compared to Lopez and
Yadav, 2010 (the only other paper on import spillovers) and provide insights not only on the existence of import spillovers
but also detail their nature (are they for example product and/or destination specific) and the mechanisms through which
they operate.
7in the restricted data set.
8There are firms in the data sourcing internationally as many as 400 varieties per year
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Table I: Imports of Swedish firms are highly concentrated
Quantiles 25% 50% 75% 90% 99%
# of annual trade interactions per source-market 1 2 42 472 5,824
# of annual trade interactions per product 3 15 46 142 538
# of annual trade interactions per variety 0 1 4 8 28
# of annual trade interactions per firm 0 1 4 13 54
value of annual trade interactions per firm (mn SEK) 0.2 2 17.5 136.6 3,458
# of source markets per imported variety 1 1 2 3 7
# of products per source market 1 1 2 3 8
# of source markets per firm 1 1 3 7 17
# of products per firm 0 1 3 8 30
Note: see Data Appendix for a detailed description of the data.
per market while 1% source more than 8 products per market. Table II displays the relationship be-
tween firm characteristics and the firm-level extensive margin of importing. Data suggest that there is
a clear positive correlation between firm-performance measures and the number of intermediate varieties
that firms import. Firms that import a greater range of intermediate varieties tend to be larger (both
in terms of employment and production), pay higher wages, spend more for intermediates and feature
higher productivity. They are also more likely to be affiliated with business groups or foreign groups and
be exporters.
Table II: The variety margin of importing (A)
varieties Employment
(SEK)
avg. wage
(tsd SEK)
input costs
(VA per worker)
productivity
(tsd SEK)
output age
(%share)
foreign ownership
(%share)
BG affiliation
(%share)
exporters
1 12.5 265,474 9,264 1,534,091 18,520 11.2 3.2 35.5 36.1
2 15.0 271,310 12,611 1,759,787 24,037 11.3 4.9 40.9 51.2
3 17.7 277,299 15,697 1,792,859 29,177 11.4 6.0 46.4 62.1
4 18.7 281,849 16,961 1,883,161 31,216 11.4 7.4 50.7 68.0
5 22.4 286,764 22,395 1,950,803 40,008 11.3 9.2 55.0 72.8
> 10 74.9 305,894 99,136 2,182,129 166,835 11.8 24.9 78.9 92.9
Note: Firm performance measures correspond to means over the entire period for the working sample.
An intermediate variety is defined as a product-source market pair.
Next, TableII displays similar results for the source market dimension of the extensive margin. Larger
and better performing firms source more varieties of the same product (i.e. the same product from more
than one countries).
Table III: The variety margin of importing (B)
varieties Employment
(SEK)
avg. wage
(tsd SEK)
input costs
(VA per worker)
productivity
(tsd SEK)
output age
(%share)
foreign ownership
(%share)
BG affiliation
(%share)
exporters
1 29.4 280,950 32,251 1,783,594 56,793 11.4 10.1 51.4 61.6
2 42.7 292,690 52,621 2,311,545 91,222 11.6 14.1 61.6 74.4
3 44.9 296,199 58,336 2,221,142 96,446 11.5 15.2 65.9 80.2
4 40.8 301,735 66,684 2,365,353 103,320 11.5 18.8 67.8 79.5
5 50.6 302,090 104,814 2,568,170 157,156 11.3 22.0 69.7 87.5
> 10 110.3 357,695 188,961 3,134,673 330,480 11.5 43.6 84.6 98.7
Note: Firm performance measures correspond to means over the entire period for the working sample.
An intermediate variety is defined as a product-source market pair.
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3 Empirical Strategy:
The dependent variable is a dummy taking the value 1 if the firm starts importing any intermediate
variety j at time t. Each firm’s import history is therefore a sequence of zeroes and ones. For a given
firm-variety pair we may have several starts. Continuing importers and import links that come to a halt
are denoted as missing. I also denote as missing the first year in the data i.e. 1997 as it would’t be
possible to identify this as an import start.
3.1 The Spillover Variables:
The explanatory variables of interest are the spillover variables. These are constructed at different levels
of disaggregation. The regional disaggregation is the county level 9 and the industrial classification is
at the 2-digit NACE level. For each firm i, seated in region r and operating in industry k at time t
four baseline measures of spillovers are defined: The general spillover (i.e. the number of other import-
ing firms in the county, importing any good from any source market), the origin-specific spillover (i.e.
the number of other firms in the county importing any intermediate from the same source market), the
product-specific spillover (i.e. the number of other importing firms in the county importing the same
intermediate from any source market) and the product-and-origin-specific spillover (i.e. the number of
other firms in the county importing the same intermediate from the same source market). Counting the
number of firms in a certain region or industry to proxy for agglomeration effects is common practice in
the urban economics literature (Lopez and Suedekum, 2009). Each spillover measure is associated with
different assumptions regarding the nature and the scope of the externalities.
The general spillover variable treats all information related to the importing decision as homogeneous,
i.e. not attached to a specific product or country of origin. The underlying assumption is that the
informational barriers that are related to entry in the import markets are of rather general nature (e.g.
familiarizing with customs’ bureaucracies).
The origin-specific spillover treats the import-relevant information as attached to specific origin market
characteristics (general availability, price level and quality of intermediates, credentials of local suppliers,
business climate and contracting environment, bilateral business relations and trade bureaucracies etc)
and hence transferrable across products but not necessarily transferrable across markets.
The product-specific spillover on the other hand, assumes that the import-relevant information is bound
to specific product characteristics (technological requirements, energy standards, production compatibil-
ity, workforce skill requirements etc.).
In the same vein, the product-and-orgin specific spillover10 variable makes the strongest assumptions
9The data specifies each firm’s location at the finest level of administrative organization , i.e. the municipality (Kommun).
There are 290 municipalities in Sweden. The next broader level of administrative classification is the county (Lan). The
290 municipalities are organized in 21 counties. For a country as extended in terms of area and as sparsely populated as
Sweden, the municipality is too fine a classification leaving us with many regions with no import activity. An alternative
considered in A.2.1 is to define regions according to functional economic areas. I therefore define the regions in terms of
the Labor Areas that are based on commuting patterns rather than administrative borders. The main results are hardly
affected.
10I will hence on refer to an intermediate product - source market pair as an intermediate variety
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regarding import-relevant information that is considered to be associated with both product as well as
origin market characteristics.
In the baseline approach I focus on regional spillovers and assess the importance of local channels via
which import spillovers operate. In Section 4.2 I further explore the idea that intra-industry and inter-
industry linkages may also be relevant channels for the exchange of import-specific information between
the firms.
Throughout the paper additional definitions and measures of spillovers are considered. In Section
4.1, non-overlapping measures of spillovers are employed in order to examine the predominance of the
spillovers’ product-and-origin dimension over the product only and country only dimensions. In Section
4.4 spillover measures are constructed by weighing each neighbor by its employment size, the imported
volume or its productivity. Moreover, in Table 15 I also employ different measures of spillovers calcu-
lating them as the share of importers in the region or as the density of importers, i.e. normalizing the
measure by the region’s area. Table A.1.4 lays out summary statistics for the main spillover variables.
3.2 Estimation Issues
Several issues merit further clarifications. When studying of import spillovers on the decision of Swedish
firms to start importing, the underlying hypothesis is that the presence of other firms in the region
importing the intermediate variety in question, positively impacts the variety-specific import decision. In
order to be able to derive a convincing interpretation from the observed positive relationship between the
agglomeration of importers in the area and the decision to start importing (as it is summarized in Table
1 featuring the baseline specification), it is necessary to account for other variables/factors not related to
spillovers that may lie behind it as well as to address simultaneity and reverse causality concerns.11
3.2.1 Omitted Variables:
Firm characteristics: Firms that are active in international markets (either through importing or
through exporting) are materially different from purely domestic firms along several dimensions. Im-
porters, just like exporters are more productive, operate at a larger scale, are likely to be bigger in terms
of employment and pay higher wages. In TableIV we observe summary statistics for core firm perfor-
mance measures (employment, wage, input costs, output and productivity) and other firm characteristics
(age, ownership), for firms that are differentiated along their international activity. A familiar pattern
emerges. Firms with some international activity (importers and exporters) outperform firms that operate
exclusively within the national boundaries along all aforementioned measures. Firms that both import
and export are the top performers.
More productive firms are more likely to be importers since they are more likely to be able to cover
11The identification of spillovers remains a very hard study area and in the absence of a truly exogenous variation it
is very hard to claim that neighboring importers, cause a certain response. By exploiting the data as well as I can and
employing an extensive set of controls and fixed effects but also performing a series of robustness exercises I try to address
at least the main concerns related to the identification of peer effects and come as close as possible to a causal interpretation
of the observed relationship.
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Table IV: Firms with international activity differ
exports
imports nor
firm neither
exports
firm only
imports
firm only
exports
imports and
firm both
employment 8.5 13.7 12.3 40.6
wage (SEK) 251,834 263,464 266,986 289,545
input costs (thsds SEK) 5,115 10,338 11,315 48,055
productivity 1,258,671 1,573,119 1,689,238 1,951,218
output (thsds SEK) 11,015 20,607 20,338 83,214
age 11.7 12.2 10.9 11,7
foreign group affiliation (% share) 1.6 2.4 4.0 14.2
business group affiliation (% share) 27.5 39.7 35.0 61.9
Note: Firm performance measures correspond to means over the entire period for the working sample.
the fixed costs of international activities. Moreover, more productive firms are more likely to self select
themselves to denser areas (Baldwin and Okubo, 2006 and Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) since they are
better equipped to survive the tougher competition. Not accounting for firm productivity could lead to
an overestimation of spillovers.
Larger firms and firms with more qualified workers are also more likely to engage in international ac-
tivities. I therefore further account for firm’s employment size and average wage. The effect of labor
costs on firms’ import behavior is ambiguous. Firms that pay higher wages are more likely to source
intermediates from abroad by means of a cost saving behavior to lower their production costs. On the
other hand, firms with more qualified workers are also likely to be sourcing intermediates of higher quality
from abroad. In a recent paper Boler et al., 2015 provide evidence that R&D and international sourcing
are complementary activities.
I also include in the vector of firm characteristics a binary variable indicating whether the firm is serving
market c as an exporter, which would grant the firm with market-specific knowledge. Exporters are more
integrated in international markets and have more experience in cross border transactions, they are there-
fore more likely to be sourcing foreign intermediate inputs from abroad. Moreover, it is likely that part
of the informational transaction costs related to breaking in international markets may be transferrable
between importing and exporting activities12.
Firms that form part of business groups (either domestic or foreign owned) are more likely to engage
in international activities (either importing or exporting), because they enjoy better reputation, better
access to finance, and increased bargaining power13. I therefore include a binary variable to indicate
whether a firm is affiliated with a business group.
The inclusion of firm-product-country fixed effects in the preferred specification, through the firm dimen-
sion captures remaining unobserved time-invariant firm level heterogeneity, reflecting inter alia differences
in managerial quality, organizational and ownership structure, reputation etc.14.
12For example customs services etc.
13Affiliates are less likely to be liquidity constrained and hence more able to cover the fixed costs related to exporting
and/or importing
14If unobserved characteristics vary over time then assuming that they are orthogonal to other firms’ import decisions
would alleviate concerns about them affecting the coefficient of spillovers.
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Figure I: Concentration of Economic and Import Activity
Area-Industry Characteristics: As noted by Aitken et al. 1997, evidence of spillovers is observa-
tionally equivalent to agglomeration arising from exogenous site-specific characteristics. Observed and
unobserved characteristics of locations such as natural advantages (proximity to the border or the sea)
as well as advantages related to the area’s infrastructure (transportation networks, proximity to ports
and/or airports, availability of logistic facilities, proximity to government services) turn these areas more
attractive to firms. In this context, if the agglomeration of import activity is just a consequence of
the agglomeration of economic activity in general in a given area, then failing to account for the area’s
economic importance and innate characteristics will lead to over interpreting the importance of import
spillovers in the data. Indeed, as it can be seen in Fig.1 below the geographical concentration of import
activity follows a similar pattern as the concentration of the economic activity across Swedish counties.
Similar concerns arise with respect to the industry in which each firm operates. Some industries are
9
Figure II: Intermediate Import Dependence
more dependent on technologies that rely on the use of foreign intermediates, hence it is both more likely
to have a larger pool of established importers operating in these industries but it is also more likely
that a firm operating in such industry engages into importing of specific varieties at some point. This
is illustrated in Fig.2. which features the intermediate import dependence (i.e. the share of imported
intermediates) by sector, in the Swedish economy. Moreover, one should make sure that what is being
captured does not simply reflect the area’s specialization in a given industry. Stockholm is a leading
centre in the production of communications equipment. Firms located in Stockholm are therefore more
likely to import or start importing a specific type of inputs intensively used in that industry for reasons
reflecting Stockholm’s specialization in communications technology rather import spillovers.
The firm dimension of the triadic fixed effects will capture all time invariant characteristics of the area
in which the firm is located but also all time invariant sectoral attributes since I have dropped firms that
have changed location and/or sector over the period covered. Respectively, any characteristics that are
specific to the area where the firm is seated and the source market, such as lower trade costs due to
shorter distances, historical and cultural ties etc 15 and are also likely to affect the coefficient of import
spillovers, will be picked up by the firm-country dimension of the triadic fixed effects. The firm-product
dimension should capture time invariant aspects of the regional specialization patterns (since a firm is
attached to a specific region and industry).
Note that this paper focuses on assessing spillovers arising from the transfer of import-specific knowledge
and information between the importing and non-importing firms rather than general agglomeration effects
related to area and/or industry specific characteristics. These general agglomeration effects involve posi-
tive market (e.g. cost sharing) as well as non market externalities (e.g. informational exchanges); negative
externalities (e.g. congestion of logistic facilities, customs bureaucracies etc), as well as competition16.
Disentangling these effects and isolating the effect of informational transactions is not straightforward
and we can in fact only capture the net effect of the forces in play.
In an effort to net out the informational component of the externalities from the general agglomeration
15for example the south of Sweden may have a natural advantage in doing business with Denmark
16Firms will be competing for the local inputs, crowding out each other on local facilities but also competing for exclusive
contracts with suppliers etc.
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effects, in the estimation progress I account for the degree of regional industrial agglomeration, by in-
cluding the region-industry share in the country-wide industrial activity (at the 2-digit level) normalized
by the region’s share of manufacturing activity (following Aitken et al.1997). As a proxy for competition
I also add the Herfindahl Index.
I further include in the control variables, the total employment in the area. The effect of the region’s
working population on individual firms’ import decisions is not straightforward and its omission may
result in either positive or negative biases. Total employment in the region is a measure of economic
activity. Areas with higher levels of economic activity also attract domestic suppliers of intermediates.
Since it is easier, in terms of informational requirements, and also cheaper to source inputs from domes-
tic suppliers it could be that all else equal, in denser areas firms tend to favor domestic intermediates.
Meanwhile, producers in such areas face larger congestion effects and increased competition for the do-
mestic inputs, which could favor the quest of foreign intermediates, encouraging the decision to source
intermediates from abroad.
Areas with denser economic activity don’t only attract a larger working force but also a larger pool of
qualified workers resulting in higher productivity and a higher propensity to source intermediates from
abroad. What is more, in such areas the turnover of employees between firms is more pronounced. Mion
and Oppromolla, 2014 and Chocqette and Meinen 2014, show that movements of managers and employees
between firms are important channels of transmission of information related with exporting activities.
I also control for the source market’s GDP, for Sweden’s total imports of intermediates from that country
to account for bilateral trade relationships (possibly reflecting the relative position of the two countries in
a value chain, the source market’s comparative advantage etc) and for the variety’s firm-specific price17.
3.2.2 Further endogeneity concerns
Common shocks: Changes in the EU’s trade policy, exchange rate movements, shocks in the source
markets as well as industry specific shocks could be confounded with the presence of import spillovers. An
appreciation of the Swedish krona vis a vis the Euro, would for example boost imports of intermediates
from Euro-Area countries and make it possible for even more firms to start sourcing intermediates from
the Eurozone18. In my baseline specification I include year effects in order to capture shocks that are
common to all industries and regions.19
In Section 4 and Table 16 I gradually add more dimensions to the year effects to account for shocks of 
different nature. Note however that the inclusion of year effects of different dimensions though accounting
for a variety of unobserved shocks cannot fully address the concern that what we capture in the estimation
process is rather the reaction to a shock affecting the propensity of firms in region r (and/or sector s) to
import product k from country c. If some firms react to this shock earlier than others then our estimation
17The SCB dataset doesn’t provide me with information about each variety’s price. The price variable here is constructed
as the total value of product-country specific imports for a given firm, divided by the weight of the respective transaction.
This is obviously an imperfect measure of price since the kilogram is not the appropriate unit of measurement for all types
of products
18Similar considerations would arise for events like China’s accession to the WTO or the EU’s enlargement.
19A common practice in the literature of spillovers, see Greenaway and Kneller 2008, Karpaty and Kneller 2010, Koenig
et al., 2009 add more references papers.
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is not in a position to fully correct for this. The reason is that we are constrained from including HS-4-
source market-county-(sector)-year effects because these would be in the same dimension as the spillover
variables. Acknowledging this shortcoming of the estimation process, one should however consider that
in the presence of 15,682 distinct input varieties imported over 15 years by approximately 10,850 firms
located in 21 counties it is not really plausible to expect that the results that survive a plethora of
robustness checks are driven by shocks so specific in nature.
I perform a decomposition exercise to distinguish the effect arising from contemporaneous entrants versus
continuing importers and systematic versus occasional importers in an attempt to further placate common
shocks concerns. If the effects were primarily driven by contemporaneous and occasional importers then
concerns that what we are actually capturing is the response to some common shock rather than import
spillovers would be more pressing.
Reverse Causality and Simultaneity: We know that the direction of the causality between an
individual firm’s decision to start importing and the firm’s productivity is not straightforward either. The
literature on imports provides evidence both in favor of a selection mechanism (only the most productive
firms are able to cover the fixed costs associated with sourcing intermediates from abroad) but is also
supportive of the existence of ”learning by importing” advocating that by gaining access to a wider range
of intermediates firms realize productivity gains (Halpren et al., 2007 etc). There is a similar ambiguous
relationship between productivity and agglomeration. As mentioned above, more productive firms are
more likely to self select themselves to denser areas (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; Baldwin and Okubo,
2006) whereas at the same time firms in agglomerated areas are likely to experience further productivity
gains, Martin et al. 2008.
Similar concerns arise with respect to other firm characteristics20. Reverse causality could also be an
issue with respect to the spillover variables, were the import activity of the other local firms to depend
on the import behavior of the firm in question21
Unobserved supply-side or demand shocks could affect both the observed firm characteristics as well as the
firm’s decision to import intermediates from abroad. A negative demand shock in the firm’s domestic or
export markets for example, could lead the firm to reduce its employment but also cut down on sourcing
intermediates as a way to downscale its production.
I therefore lag all right-hand-side variables, including spillovers by a year22.
4 Results
I assume that a firm starts importing a particular variety at time t if the subsequent profits from including
this variety in its sourcing strategy are positive i.e. Πirskct = piirskct + irskct. Πirskct consists of the
20Are bigger, in terms of employment firms more likely to be importers or do firms that engage into importing expand
their employment?
21This is the ”reflection problem” permeating the literature on peer effects.
22This, although being a common practice in the spillovers literature does not fully alleviate endogeneity concerns since
there remains the possibility that some firms react with a lag
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observed piirskct and the unobserved part of the profit irskct where irskct in turn encompasses both a
transitory uirskctand a time invariant component δikc. The net increase in firm’s profit from including
that variety in its bundle of intermediates is expected to be increasing with respect to firm performance
measures and Sweden’s demand capacity for intermediates from country c while it is expected to be
decreasing in bilateral trade frictions. Our variables of interest are the spillovers which are assumed to
operate via lowering the fixed costs of sourcing intermediates from abroad. Hence the probability that a
firm starts importing a particular variety at time t reads:
Prob(yirskct = 1|Xirskct, irskct) = Prob(X ′irskctβ + δt + δikc + uirskct > 0) (1)
where yirskct=1 is an indicator variable signaling a switch from not importing that variety in t − 1 to
including it in the firm’s intermediate space in time t, Xirskct is a vector of firm, industry, region,
product and source market covariates understood to affect the import decision. I estimate 1with a logit
procedure controlling for firm-product-source-market fixed effects. A motivation and a discussion of the
characterization of the extensive margin of importing lying behind (1) follows in Section 5.
The inclusion of triadic firm-product-country fixed effects allows me to control for inter-firm heterogeneity
within a given area and industry, as well as for firm-country and firm-product heterogeneity. Area and
industry time-invariant characteristics are captured by the firm dimension of the triadic fixed effects since
firms that switch location and/or industry have been dropped from the sample. The product-country
dimension of the triad allows to control for mean effects in each product line as well as for the market
conditions in the source countries. The only remaining variability is in the time dimension within a given
firm-product-country triad. What I am estimating is therefore the effect of a change in the agglomeration
variables over time with respect to the average level of agglomeration over the entire studied period, on
the decision to start importing, at the firm-product-country level. Standard errors are clustered at the
intersection of the area level and industry classification to deal with the possibility of misleadingly small
resulting standard errors.23
The benchmark specification also includes year effects and as a robustness check, an additional set of year
effects with more dimensions is included (4.6). In the baseline specification, all right hand side variables
are lagged by one period to deal with endogeneity and simultaneity concerns, whereas all non-binary
right hand side variables, except for the spillover variables, are expressed in natural logarithms. Spillover
variables are used in levels24.
4.1 Identifying spillovers on individual firms decision to start importing
Tables (1)-(3) provide evidence of regional import spillovers and detail their nature as product and source-
market specific. Table 1, gradually builds up the baseline specification used to identify regional spillovers
23Regressing individual variables on aggregate variables is known to introduce a downward bias in the estimation of
standard errors leading to erroneous conclusions regarding the significance of coefficients, Moulton (1990)
24In Table A.1.1 I further address this point by investigating non linearities of spillovers. The results of this exercise
provide support for my choice of baseline specification.
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on firms’ individual import decisions. The left-hand-side variable summarizes the most specific import
decision i.e. the decision to start importing a given input from a given source market. Only the most
specific spillover variable, namely the number of other firms in the county importing the same variety, is
used. In columns (1) to (5), regressions are performed employing gradually more controls. In the first
column only the spillover variable is included in the controls. In column (2), I add a set of firm-level
characteristics accounting for the firm’s size (number of employees), productivity (value added per
worker), average wage paid by the firm, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm is affiliated to
some business group and a dummy indicating whether the firm is acquainted with the source market in
question via exporting activities. Column (3) further includes a set of area-wide and industry-wide
characteristics. The region’s economic size and industrial activity are captured by the county-level
employment and a measure of the region’s industrial concentration, as detailed earlier in Section 3.
The number of active firms in the region captures the intensity of competition and congestion effects.
Column (5) additionally controls for a set of source-market characteristics, accounting for the trade
partner’s GDP and for the total intermediate imports from that country. Column (3) also accounts
for the variety’s firm-specific price. Column (5) will be referred to as the baseline (or benchmark)
specification.
Firm-level controls all enter with the expected sign. Bigger and more productive firms are more likely
to start importing any product-country pair at any given time t, and so is true for firms that pay
higher wages and firms that are affiliated with business groups. Firms that have familiarized themselves
with international markets through exporting are also more likely to activate their product and country
specific import status at any given time t. However, only the coefficients on size, productivity and
the country-specific export status are significant at the 1% and the coefficient of the dummy variable
indicating whether a firm is affiliated with a business group is significant but only at the 10% level. Not
surprisingly, the coefficient on the variety’s price is negative and highly significant. Area-wide controls
enter with negative signs reflecting competition and congestion forces but also the availability of local
intermediates in areas with concentrated economic activity, that are competing with foreign intermediates.
The region’s industry concentration has a positive sign but fails to enter significantly. The trade partner’s
GDP is positive and highly significant in line with the gravity theory predictions. So is true for the total
intermediate imports from that country.
The coefficient on the product and origin specific spillover, is positive and highly significant, and remains
significant and broadly unchanged in magnitude even as we add more controls. One additional neighbor
(in the same county) importing the intermediate variety increases the probability that a firm in the same
region will start importing the same variety by roughly 1.2 percentage points. 25.
In Table 2, I go one step further in exploring the nature of these spillovers by trying to identify the
relevant source of information. In columns (1) to (4), the preferred specification is used, but now four
different spillover variables are studied, moving from the most general to the most specific definition:
25Following Train 2009, the marginal effect in terms of pp changes of probability can be calculated as 0.012 = 0.0482 ×
0.45× (1 − .045), where 0.45 is the average probability of starting to import any intermediate variety at time t.
14
Table 1: Identifying import spillovers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Country Spillover: # of (other) same vari-
ety importers in the region
0.0570*** 0.0561*** 0.0559*** 0.0523*** 0.0504***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(employment) 0.6120*** 0.6122*** 0.6159*** 0.6184***
(0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0145) (0.0146)
ln(avg wage) 0.0025 0.0028 0.0054 0.0051
(0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0203) (0.0203)
export status (dest. specific) 0.3587*** 0.3593*** 0.3279*** 0.3101***
(0.0152) (0.0152) (0.0162) (0.0163)
BG affi 0.0437* 0.0447** 0.0418* 0.0460*
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0184) (0.0184)
ln(VA per worker) 0.3210*** 0.3210*** 0.3194*** 0.3178***
(0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0156) (0.0156)
Industry-Region characteristics (t-1)
HHI -0.0001* -0.0001** -0.0001**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(county’s ind conc) 0.0242 0.0117 0.0146
(0.0206) (0.0224) (0.0224)
ln(regional employment) -0.5167*** -0.5869*** -0.5870***
(0.0987) (0.1062) (0.1066)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
ln(variety price) -0.1225*** -0.1210***
(0.0223) (0.0225)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) 0.6989***
(0.0635)
ln(Int Imports Land) 0.2986***
(0.0236)
# Observations 663,138 661,868 661,868 548,039 545,988
# id panels 73,172 73,058 73,058 64,063 63,886
pseudo R-squared 0.008 0.019 0.019 0.019 0.021
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
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Table 2: Unbundling the nature of import spillovers (A)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Spillover measures (t-1)
General Spillover: # other importers in the county,
any product-source
-0.0004
(0.0002)
Product Spillover: # other importers in the county,
same product-any source
0.0147***
(0.0009)
Origin Spillover: # other importers in the county,
any product-same source
0.0077***
(0.0002)
Product-Origin Spillover: # other importers in the
county, same product-source
0.0504***
(0.0020)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988
# id panels 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886
pseudo R-squared 0.018 0.019 0.022 0.021
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country
fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All regressions include
all control variables that are omitted in the table for the sake of presentation.
The General Spillover (# of other importers in the county, across products and source markets), the
Product Spillover (# of other importers in the county, same product, across source markets), the Origin
Spillover (# of other importers in the county, across products, same source market) and the Product-
Origin Spillover (# of other importers in the county, same product and source-market). The coefficient
on the General Spillover is negative but not significant. The negative sign suggests that the negative
externalities dominate. The more specific spillover variables all enter positively and with significant
coefficients at the 1% level. The order of magnitude of the coefficient on the Origin Spillover is however
very small. Results in Table 2, suggest that the most specific spillover variable appears to be import
spillovers. In Table 3, I attempt to shed more light in the nature of import spillovers by examining the
predominance of the spillovers’ product-and-origin specificity over the product-only and/or origin-only
specificity that appear significant in 2. In Column (1), the General Spillover is decomposed in four non-
overlapping spillover measures, the number of firms importing the same product from the same source
(Product-Origin Spillover), the number of firms importing the same product from a different source, the
number of firms importing a different product from the same source, and the number of firms importing
a different product from a different source. Note that the coefficient on the number of importers of a
different product from a different source-market is negative, suggesting that competition and congestion
effects override any positive information gains and market externalities, possibly because the scope for
the latter is rather limited in the case of importing neighbors that source in different intermediates from
different origins. The coefficients on all other measures of spillovers are positive and highly significant but
there is a clear ranking in terms of magnitudes confirming the predominance of the product and origin
specific spillover.
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Table 3: Unbundling the nature of Import Spillovers (B)
Spillover
General
Spillover
Product
Spillover
Origin
Spillover
Product-Origin
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0394*** 0.0495*** 0.0435*** 0.0504***
(0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0020)
# of other firms importing the same product from a
different market
0.0074*** 0.0070***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
# of other firms importing a different product from
the same market
0.0054*** 0.0071***
(0.0003) (0.0002)
# of other firms importing a different product from
a different market
-0.0023***
(0.0003)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988
# id panels 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886
pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country
fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All regressions include
all control variables that are omitted in the table for the sake of presentation.
In Column (2), I decompose the Product Spillover into the number of firms that import the same product-
source-market pair and the number of firms that import the same product from a different source market.
A similar decomposition is performed to the Origin Spillover, which in Column (3) is broken down to the
number of firms that import the same product-source-market pair and the number of firms that import a
different product from the same source market. The coefficients on the Product-Origin Spillover remain
broadly unchanged whereas the coefficients on the additional variables although positive and significant
further confirm that product and origin specific spillovers are stronger than product only or origin only
spillovers, thus corroborating our baseline specification. Column (4) represents the baseline specification.
In the following two sections I will consider whether the flow of import relevant information that I call
import spillovers depends on the characteristics of firms that communicate their experience (sender ca-
pacity) but also the characteristics of the firms that receive this information (absorptive capacity).
4.2 Sender Capacity: Who carries import relevant information?
So far, in our baseline specification, as presented in Table 1, the study of spillovers on individual firms’
import decisions treats all surrounding importers as identical, hence all firms enter symmetrically (i.e. as
carrying equal weight) in the construction of the spillover variables. Next, in Table 4, I look at how the
characteristics of neighbors affect the strength of the agglomeration effects. In other words, I focus on the
determinants of the neighboring firms’ ”sender capacity”. Column (1) replicates for one more time the
baseline specification. In columns (2) and (3), I investigate the importance of neighbors’ size (in terms of
employment) on the individual import decision, in an attempt to understand whether import spillovers
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arise from the presence of neighboring firms or from the size of surrounding importers. Thinking of size
in terms of employment is in accordance with evidence that employee turnover across firms or casual
interactions between workers promote the dissemination of knowledge among firms. A recent example
in the literature is Mion and Opromolla, 2013 who provide evidence on how previously acquired export
experience of managers transfers to their new employer as they switch firms.
In more detail, in Column (2) the Product-Origin Spillover variable is used while I am also including the
average size of same variety importers in the region as a control, which enters significantly and with a
negative sign26. In Column (3), I allow for bigger neighboring importing firms to exert greater influence
by weighing each firm by its size (i.e. the number of employees) in the construction of spillover variables.
Hence, the employment-weighed Product-Origin Spillover variable counts the number of employees work-
ing for other same variety importers in the county. The order of magnitude of this coefficient, although
significant at the 1% level, is very small suggesting that indeed the size of importing neighbors doesn’t
matter 27. In Columns (4) and (5) I repeat the same routine but focus on productivity instead. The
average productivity of the same variety importers in the region enters significantly, though only at the
10% level and the productivity weighed Product-Origin Spillover is significant at the 1% level (though
of a lesser magnitude compared to the unweighted spillover) suggesting that more productive importers
have a greater weight in influencing their neighbors’ import decisions.
The last column explores whether spillover effects arise stronger from neighboring importers that import
larger volumes of the intermediate varieties in question. The average imported volume in the region is
included in the controls but fails to enter significantly.
I continue to focus on the determinants of the sender capacity in Table 5. Column (1) summarizes
the baseline specification. In Column (2), I investigate whether the organizational structure of neigh-
boring firms matters for the strength of import spillovers. The Product-Origin Spillover is decomposed
between multi-plant and single-plant firms. Only single-plant same variety importers have a significant
impact on individual import decisions. In Column (3) the Product-Origin spillover is broken down to
same variety importers that also register exporting activity and those that do not. Firms that engage
both into exporting and importing are more integrated in international markets and more acquainted
with international operations, hence we would expect that the information they generate proves to be
more relevant. It appears however that most of the spillover effects arise from non-exporting importers,
implying that more internationalized firms may pose greater competition in import markets. In Column
(4) the Product-Origin Spillover is decomposed according to the ownership structure of the firm into
neighboring importers that are affiliated with some business group and neighboring importers that are
stand alone firms. Spillovers arising from firms that are not affiliated with business groups are stronger.
In Column (5) importers that are affiliated with business groups are further decomposed according to
the Business Group’s country of origin (Sweden or abroad), whereas the set of non-affiliated importers is
26Reflecting increased competition/congestion effects arising in a denser area outweighs positive market and non-market
externalities.
27These results provide support for using the unweighted Product-Origin Spillover variable as the preferred measure of
spillover.
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Table 4: Does the size of neighbors matter?:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0504*** 0.0465*** 0.0503*** 0.0462***
(0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0021)
Employment weighed spillover measures (t-1)
average size of same source-market same product im-
porting firms in the county
-0.0230***
(0.0069)
Product-Origin Spillover: # employees working for
other importers in the county, same product-source
0.0001***
(0.0000)
Productivity weighed spillover measures (t-1)
average productivity of same source-market same
product importing firms in the county
0.0584*
(0.0228)
Product-Origin Spillover (productivity weighed): 0.0210***
(0.0012)
Accounting for avg imported volume
# avg imported volume in the region 0.0000
(0.0000)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(employment) 0.6184*** 0.5865*** 0.6201*** 0.6186*** 0.6194*** 0.5868***
(0.0146) (0.0185) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0185)
ln(avg wage) 0.0051 0.0556* 0.0062 0.0053 0.0061 0.0553*
(0.0203) (0.0264) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0264)
export status (dest. specific) 0.3101*** 0.2958*** 0.3121*** 0.3102*** 0.3115*** 0.2958***
(0.0163) (0.0209) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0209)
BG affiliation 0.0460* 0.0543* 0.0477** 0.0460* 0.0479** 0.0544*
(0.0184) (0.0239) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0239)
ln(VA per worker) 0.3178*** 0.2528*** 0.3161*** 0.2949*** 0.3151*** 0.2530***
(0.0156) (0.0194) (0.0156) (0.0180) (0.0156) (0.0194)
Industry - Region characteristics (t-1)
HHI -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001)
ln(county’s ind conc) 0.0146 0.0400 0.0253 0.0135 0.0226 0.0376
(0.0224) (0.0335) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0335)
ln(regional employment) -0.5870*** -0.6197*** -0.6694*** -0.5936*** -0.6446*** -0.6507***
(0.1066) (0.1613) (0.1067) (0.1066) (0.1066) (0.1611)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
ln(variety price) -0.1210*** -0.1077** -0.1293*** -0.1211*** -0.1243*** -0.1068**
(0.0225) (0.0384) (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0384)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) 0.6989*** 0.4022*** 0.7308*** 0.7000*** 0.7406*** 0.3982***
(0.0635) (0.0854) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0854)
ln(Int Imports Land) 0.2986*** 0.2896*** 0.3029*** 0.2976*** 0.2902*** 0.2888***
(0.0236) (0.0356) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0356)
# Observations 545,988 296,486 545,988 545,988 545,988 296,486
# id panels 63,886 38,957 63,886 63,886 63,886 38,957
pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.021 0.020
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
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decomposed into state-controlled28, and private firms. Privately-owned Swedish firms that are not affili-
ated with business groups, are the main source of import spillovers, followed by Swedish business groups
and foreign business groups, and last on state-controlled importers. Business groups have an advantage
in negotiating contracts with suppliers posing more intense competition to other firms in accessing the
import markets. The presence of foreign groups not only presents greater competition but moreover they
may promote direct purchases of intermediates from their plants. In Column (6), I distinguish between
neighboring headquarters and plants. The Product-Origin Spillover is broken into the number of head-
quarters in the area and the number of worksites (i.e. plants) importing a given input variety. There is
a marginally stronger headquarter effect on individual import decisions. The stronger headquarter effect
can be interpreted as implying that import decisions are primarily generated at the HQ level, but it could
also mean that information acquired via neighboring headquarters is deemed as more credible. Having in
mind that single plant firms in our sample are located in the same region as their headquarters, we can
gain further insight for the results reported in Column (3), i.e. why most of the effect arrises from other
single-plant firms in the area. Moreover, note hat the effect of importing plants is significant at the 5%
level and of broadly the same magnitude, suggesting that a firm’s sub-entities also bear import relevant
knowledge that is either generated within them or communicated via intra-firm exchanges.
Interestingly, import spillovers are more important when arising from firms that are more similar in
terms of organization and ownership structure. This finding can be understood as suggesting that
more complicated business structures imply that information generated within these firms is not as
directly accessible/observable. Given that I restrict my attention to the import decisions of single-plant,
domestically-owned firms, this can also be interpreted as suggesting that firms characterized by simpler
organizational structures are not able to assimilate information arising from more complex institutions.
4.3 Absorptive Capacity: How do firms differ in the way they assimilate
import relevant information?
The question addressed in this section is to what extent do individual firm characteristics matter for the
way they absorb spillovers, in other words whether firm characteristics matter for the assimilation of any
import relevant information/opportunities arising from their neighbors.
In Table 6, I am looking for evidence of heterogeneity with respect to firms size (in terms of employment)
and productivity (measured as value added per employee). Column (1) summarizes the baseline specifica-
tion. In Column (2), I interact the benchmark spillover variable with the firm’s size. The interaction term
fails to enter significantly suggesting that agglomeration effects are broadly similar for firms of different
employment classes 29. In Column (3) the spillover variable is interacted with a binary variable indicating
whether the firm’s employment size is above the sample’s median employment (8 employees), whereas
in Column (4) the spillover variable is interacted with a binary variable indicating whether the firm’s
28By state-control firms I refer to firms that are owned/controlled by the central government, the county or the munici-
pality.
29This finding further alleviates concerns arising from my decision to exclude from the working sample firms with zero
employees.
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Table 5: Does the organizational/ownership structure of the firm matter?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # other importers in the
county, same product-source
0.0504***
(0.0020)
Organizational structure:
# of single-plant importers 0.0504***
(0.0020)
# of multi-plant importers 0.0853
(0.0969)
Export Status:
# of exporters 0.0465***
(0.0024)
# of non exporters 0.0663***
(0.0057)
Ownership Structure:
# of B.G.-affiliated importers 0.0450***
(0.0027)
# of non-B.G.-affiliated importers 0.0605***
(0.0041)
# of importers affiliated with foreign B.G. 0.0284***
(0.0056)
# of importers affiliated with Swedish B.G 0.0513***
(0.0033)
# of private-owned non-B.G.-affiliated importers 0.0591***
(0.0041)
# of state-owned importers 0.0111***
(0.0347)
Importance of Headquarters:
# of HQ of importers 0.0509***
(0.0021)
# of importing plants 0.0504**
(0.0175)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988
# triads (firm-product-source) 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886
pseudo R-squared 0.024 0.021 0.024 0.021 0.022 0.021
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All regressions include year ef-
fects, firm-product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
21
Table 6: Do bigger or more productive firms benefit more from import spillovers?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # other importers in the
county, same product-source
0.0504*** 0.0619*** 0.0509*** 0.0507*** 0.1236*** 0.0509*** 0.0519***
(0.0020) (0.0037) (0.0021) (0.0020) (0.0206) (0.0021) (0.0021)
Interaction terms (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover×size -0.0044
(0.0012)
Product-Origin Spillover×above median size 0.0021*
(0.0026)
Product-Origin Spillover×above mean size 0.0051
(0.0048)
Product-Origin Spillover×productivity -0.0052
(0.0014)
Product-Origin Spillover×above median productivity -0.0013
(0.0016) Product-Origin Spillover×above mean productivity
-0.0070
(0.0020)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988
# id panels 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886
pseudo R-squared 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All regressions include year ef-
fects, firm-product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
employment size is above the sample’s mean employment (28 employees). The two interaction terms are
only slightly significant (at the 10% level) whereas their magnitude is very small, providing additional
evidence on the lack of heterogeneity with respect to a firm’s employment class. Columns (5)-(7) repeat
the routine detailed in columns (2)-(4) but studying heterogeneity with respect to productivity instead
of size. None of the interaction terms enters significantly. In all columns, the inclusion of the interaction
terms doesn’t affect the coefficients on the spillover variable. Findings in Table 6 provide no evidence of
heterogeneity in the effect of the presence of other importers in the area on individual import decisions
for firms of different sizes or productivity levels.
In Table 7, I continue to explore how individual firm characteristics affect the strength of import
spillovers. Results presented in this table provide no evidence of heterogeneity in the way individual
firms assimilate import relevant information from the surrounding firms with respect to other firm-
specific characteristics, besides productivity and size, such as a firm’s export status (Column 2), a firm’s
affiliation to a business group (Column 3), or the firm’s ownership structure (Column 4). None of the
interaction terms is significant (with the exception of the interaction with the firm’s export status which
enters significantly but only at the 10% level) and their inclusion doesn’t affect the coefficient on the
spillover variable.
4.4 Further results
4.4.1 Different groups of source markets
I go on to investigate whether the importance of spillovers varies with the origin of imports, in other
words, whether spillovers are more relevant for the decision to import intermediates from some source
markets as compared to others. We could argue that spillovers may be be more relevant for some markets
where the costs of acquiring information related to the availability and the characteristics of inputs or
the credentials of potential suppliers and the contractual environment are expected to be higher.
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Table 7: Firm characteristics and absorptive capacity
baseline exporter consolidated state-controlled
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0504*** 0.0530*** 0.0518*** 0.0504***
(0.0020) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0020)
textbfInteraction terms (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover×exporter -0.0060*
(0.0020)
Product-Origin Spillover×BG -0.0027
(0.0022)
Product-Origin Spillover×state controlled -0.0226
(0.0171)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988
# id panels 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886
pseudo R-squared 0.022 0.024 0.025 0.024
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All regressions include year ef-
fects, firm-product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
In Table 8, countries are sorted in groups applying an imperfect criterion of accessibility. The respec-
tive groups consist of the Scandinavian countries (Finland, Norway, Iceland and Denmark), Sweden’s
closest neighbors but also very similar in terms of business practices, business climate etc.30, the non-
Scandinavian EU-27 countries (including Switzerland but excluding Denmark and Finland), the rest of
the OECD (excluding EU members and Nordic members), the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India China and
South Africa) and the rest of the world, including Africa, the Americas, Oceania (excluding its OECD
members), the Middle-East etc. Spillovers matter for all respective source groups, and not surprisingly
they matter more for the ”less accessible” partners grouped under Rest of the World. Note that what we
call lack of accessibility is over and above the effect of distance, historical ties or culture which are time
invariant and are therefore picked up by the firm-country dimension of the triadic fixed effects as well as
the partner country’s GDP and total imports which are already controlled for.
4.4.2 Do spillovers exhibit spatial decay?
In Table 9, I explore the geographic scope of regional import spillovers. The first column once more
replicates the benchmark specification. In Column (2), I am using as a measure of spillovers the number
of importers of the same variety that are located anywhere in the country. In Column (3) this measure
is broken down to its regional and non-regional component, i.e. the number of other importers of that
intermediate variety located in the same county and those located in a different county -regardless of
distance-. One additional same variety importer located anywhere in Sweden increases the chances of an
individual firm starting to import that variety by 0.3 percentage points.
30Nordic economies are also very integrated in terms of policies, trade etc
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Table 8: Spillovers and source market accessibility
baseline Nordics EU-27 OECD BRICS RoW
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0570*** 0.0268*** 0.0368*** 0.0388*** 0.0511 0.0668***
(0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0061) (0.0030) (0.0094) (0.0167)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(employment) 0.5578*** 0.8028*** 0.4808*** 0.4406*** 0.6327***
(0.0266) (0.0267) (0.0280) (0.0608) (0.0645)
ln(avg wage) 0.0550 -0.0626 0.0119 -0.0058 -0.0399
(0.0414) (0.0424) (0.0335) (0.0669) (0.0818)
export status (dest. specific) 0.3556*** 0.2398*** 0.2914*** 0.1769** 0.3447***
(0.0288) (0.0292) (0.0331) (0.0585) (0.0838)
BG affi 0.0058 0.0412 0.0073 0.2191** 0.2855***
(0.0330) (0.0314) (0.0397) (0.0765) (0.0861)
ln(VA per worker) 0.3202*** 0.4365*** 0.2459*** 0.2017*** 0.3113***
(0.0302) (0.0300) (0.0275) (0.0589) (0.0669)
Industry-Region characteristics (t-1)
HHI -0.0002** -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002)
ln(county’s ind conc) -0.0036 0.0343 -0.0224 -0.1684 -0.1653
(0.0407) (0.0399) (0.0450) (0.0948) (0.1045)
ln(regional employment) -0.7814*** -0.2787 -0.1891 -0.6194 0.1743
(0.1872) (0.1921) (0.2227) (0.4542) (0.4814)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
ln(variety price) -0.0236 -0.1109** -0.0270 -0.3219*** 0.0168
(0.0370) (0.0387) (0.0590) (0.0938) (0.1066)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) -1.0554*** -1.9260*** 1.1715** 3.6451*** 4.0645***
(0.1553) (0.1673) (0.4243) (0.5225) (0.5144)
ln(Int Imports Land) 0.5032*** -0.2011*** 0.1704* 0.5421* -0.3758***
(0.1203) (0.0423) (0.0755) (0.2446) (0.0968)
# Observations 663,138 179,300 186,419 117,468 36,190 26,611
# id panels 73,172 20,033 22,275 13,792 4,538 3,248
pseudo R-squared
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
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Table 9: Do spillovers exhibit spatial decay?
(1) (2) (3)
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0504*** 0.0248***
(0.0020) (0.0022)
Spatial breakdowns (t-1)
# firms in Sweden (same variety) 0.0159***
(0.0004)
# firms in the rest of Sweden (same variety) 0.0147***
(0.0005)
# of firms in nearby counties (same variety)
# of firms in more distant counties (same variety)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,988
# id panels 63,886 63,886 63,886
pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.025 0.03
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All regressions include year ef-
fects, firm-product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
4.4.3 Physical proximity (same neighborhood) or industrial affinity (same 2-digit indus-
try)?
I have so far treated the diffusion of import-relevant information among firms as a purely regional phe-
nomenon. Through physical proximity that facilitates monitoring other firms’ import practices, but
also the exchange of firm-specific knowledge via (casual or business) interactions between employees,
neighbors’ import experience becomes accessible to other firms in the region.
Intra-industry linkages: The literature on export spillovers has also established a positive relation-
ship between the presence of other firms in the same industry and individual firms’ decisions to enter a
certain market with a certain product (Koenig 2009; Koenig et al., 2010; Mayeneris and Poncet, 2013;
Chocquette and Meinen 2014 etc.). These findings suggest that export-relevant information is not re-
gionally bounded but is also diffused through intra-industry linkages. I explore the scope for spillovers
operating through intra-industry linkages for the import case in Column (2) of Table 10, (Column 1 as
usual reports the baseline specification).
The intra-industry Product-Origin Spillover, is now measured as the number of importers of the same
variety that operate in the same industry regardless of region. Given that information regarding imports
of intermediates is highly specialized, and bound to a firm’s production process and technological require-
ments, one would expect that observing other firms in the same industry (i.e. firms likely to be sharing
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similar technologies) matters as well for individual import decisions. Not surprisingly, this variable is
also highly significant. One additional importer operating in the same 2-digit industry (irrespective of
location) increases the probability that any firm starts importing this variety at time t by 0.9 percentage
points.
Inter-industry linkages: The respective literature that has looked at the role of industrial linkages
as a vehicle for informational transactions across firms, makes the distinction between backward linkages
(i.e. linkages between a firm and its buyers) and forward linkages (i.e. linkages between a firm and its
suppliers). The former type comes across as an important channel for export spillovers arising from the
presence of multinational firms in Kneller and Pisu, 2007; as well as for productivity spillovers arising
again from multinational firms as documented in Javorcik, 2004. Chocquette and Meinen, 2014 also find
that backward linkages are an important channel for the transmission of country-specific export-relevant
information among firms.
Buyer-seller relationships can indeed facilitate the dissemination of knowledge about specific source mar-
kets or available intermediates. One possible mechanism is that this informational exchange occurs
through the regular contact between workers and managers of these firms. Moreover, a firm’s buyers that
are already using a particular type of input for some other process may have the bargaining power to ask
the firm to customize its product and its production process by using the same input. In the same vein,
a firm may require its suppliers to act accordingly. Another possible explanation is that the very nature
of buyer-seller relationships is conducive to familiarizing with other firms’ technologies and the inputs to
their production.
The importance of inter-industry linkages as a channel through which import spillovers operate is ex-
plored in Column (3). Three alternative measures of spillovers are employed here. I use the intra-industry
Product-Origin Spillover (i.e. the # of other same product-country pair importers operating in the same
industry across locations) and two channel variables accounting for backward and forward linkages.
Channel variables: The construction of the channel variables for backward and forward linkages
follows Javorcik, 2004, as it has been adapted for the study of export spillovers by Chocquette and
Meinen, 2014. Since I do not have access to buyer-seller data, I will be using yearly input-output
tables. Hence, the channel variable for backward linkages represents ties between a non-importing firm
i operating in industry k that considers starting to import product g from country c at time t and its
buyers’ (i.e. firms that operate in buying -downstream- industries) import strategies. Respectively, the
channel variable for forward linkages represents relations between a non-importing firm i operating in
industry k that considers starting to import product g from country c at time t and its suppliers’ (i.e.
firms that operate in supplying -upstream- industries) import practices. In more detail, the channel
variable for backward linkages is:
Backward Linkageskgjt =
∑
s6=k
αstSpillisgjt (2)
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where αst is the share of sector k
′s output that serves as an input to other manufacturing sectors s 6= k31.
And, the channel variable for forward linkages is:
Forward Linkageskgjt =
∑
s 6=k
βstSpillisgjt (3)
where βst is the share (with respect to the total manufacturing input) of sector s
′ output that serves as
an input to sector k. The results reported in Column (3) suggest that inter-industry spillovers do matter.
We find that import spillovers arise stronger from a firm’s buyers (i.e. backward linkages). Forward
linkages are also positive, though of smaller magnitude and significant only at the 10% level.32.
Spatial decay: In Columns (4)-(5), I attempt to hierarchize the importance of industrial linkages over
the importance of regional ties and assess whether physical proximity matters more for intra-industry or
inter-industry channels. In Column (4), I decompose the regional Product-Origin Spillover in its region-
and-industry specific component (i.e. the number of firms in the county that also operate in the same
industry), and the number of firms in the county that operate in different industries. The coefficients
on the two components are both significant at the 1% level. Most of the effect though is coming from
the most specific component, importers of the same product-source market combination that are located
in the same county and operate in the same industry. One additional importer in the same county and
industry increases the chances for the firm to start importing that product from the same source-market
by roughly 2 percentage points. On the other hand, one additional importer in the same county but
operating in a different region increases the chances for the firm to start importing that variety by hardly
one percentage point. These findings advocate in favor of a ”Porter” interpretation of regional spillovers.
The last column further explores whether geographical proximity amplifies the importance of intra as well
as inter-industry linkages for the decision to start importing. I allow the firm’s decision to start importing
a particular product-source-market combination to be influenced by the number of same product-origin
importers located anywhere in the country and operating in any industry. This across industry and
locations spillover is broken down to the number of importers in the same location and industry, the
number of importers in the same location but different industry, the number of importers in the same
industry but different location and the number of importers in a different industry and location. All these
terms are highly significant and of the expected sign. The predominance of the region-and-sector specific
Product-Origin Spillover gains further support. Moreover, it is clear that both inter-industry, and to a
greater extent, intra-industry spillovers are accentuated by physical proximity implying that there is still
some value for the importance of information transmitted through face-to-face interactions.
As noted by Choqette and Meinen (2014), geographical proximity may matter more for some channels
than for others. The reasoning behind this claim is that face-to-face interactions that are facilitated
31I only consider the total manufacturing input, hence the share is constructed with respect to the manufacturing com-
ponent of other sectors’ input to sector s′ production.
32The channel variables are indexes and as a result the interpretation of their respective coefficients is not directly
comparable to the coefficient of the intra-industry spillover that counts the number of importers.
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by geographical proximity may prove more important for monitoring the export strategy of competitors
(peer firms operating in the same industry) but less less so for firms in other industries since inter-industry
linkages are not necessarily bounded by geography as buyer-seller relationships provide channels for the
diffusion of firm-specific knowledge and experience.
4.5 Robustness Checks
In this section I perform several robustness checks and further explore the nature of import spillovers.
4.5.1 Taking into account firms’ own experience
The next two tables, Table 11 and Table 12 accommodate in the analysis different dimensions of a
firm’s own experience with respect to a specific product or source-market.
In Table 11, I study whether spillovers continue to be important for individual import decisions once
we account for a firm’s own past import experience. It is only intuitive to expect that through its past
experiences with a certain variety, product or source market, the firm accumulates information that
will likely prove to be useful in the future and contribute to lowering the fixed costs associated with
importing. In Column (2), I include in the controls, a dummy variable indicating whether the firm has
previously imported that same variety 33. Having imported a specific variety in the past and having
discontinued its use, has a large negative and significant effect on the probability to re-import that
product-source market pair. A firm that has at some point in the past imported a variety and then
dropped its use is approximately twice less likely to start importing that variety again. The coefficient
of the Product-and-Origin specific spillover variable, but only significant at the 10% level. The negative
sign on the variety-specific import experience can be understood as suggestive of variety-specific sunk
costs associated with importing intermediates, or as reflecting a negative, unsatisfactory past experience
with a particular variety that renders its future use less likely.
In Column (3), I account for a firm’s product-specific past experience by including a dummy variable that
takes up the value one if the firm in question has previously imported that 4-digit product code (from
any source market), whereas in Column (4), I look more closely at the importance of the product-specific
import experience by accounting separately for the firm’s variety-specific import experience as well as
for the firm’s past experience in importing the same 4-digit product code but from a different source
market. Both experience variables are highly significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively. A firm
that has in the past imported the same 4-digit product code from a different source-market it is 15.8
percentage points more likely to start importing that product-code from the source market in question.
Note that accounting for firm’s product experience only slightly affects the magnitude of the coefficient
on the product-and-origin specific spillover, doesn’t affect its significance.
33To avoid any endogeneity concerns arising from the fact that this variable would be a linear combination of my dependent
variable I restrict each firm’s relevant import history so as to exclude the first ”switch”. As it has been discussed before I
only focus on firms that appear in my data after the year 2000. What dictates this restriction for this exercise is the fact
that since the firms’ import histories extend prior to the first year in my dataset I cannot be sure that a firm’s first decision
really is the first decision or just the first decision I observe in my sample.
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Table 10: Industry or Region?
(baseline)
Spillover
Regional
Spillover
Sectoral
Channels
Industrial
industry
breakdown by
within region
Decay
Spatial
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin spillover: # other same product-
same source importers in the county
0.0504***
(0.0020)
Product-Origin spillover:# other same product-same
source importers in the county
0.0367*** 0.0309***
(0.0011) (0.0012)
# other same product-source importers in the same
county-industry
0.0820*** 0.0051***
(0.0043) (0.0006)
# other same product-source importers in the same
county but a diff. industry
0.0385*** 0.0015***
(0.0025) (0.0003)
# other same product-source importers in the same
industry but diff. county
0.0028***
(0.0002)
# other same product-source importers in a diff. in-
dustry and diff. county
0.0011***
(0.0001)
Channel variables (t-1)
forward linkages 0.0132*
(0.0054)
backward linkages 0.0822***
(0.0065)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(employment) 0.6184*** 0.6137*** 0.6140*** 0.6181*** 0.0527***
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0013)
ln(avg wage) 0.0051 0.0074 0.0064 0.0061 0.0016
(0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0204) (0.0203) (0.0019)
export status (dest. specific) 0.3101*** 0.3096*** 0.3090*** 0.3095*** 0.0280***
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0015)
BG affiliation 0.0460* 0.0451* 0.0458* 0.0455* 0.0047*
(0.0184) (0.0185) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0018)
ln(VA per worker) 0.3178*** 0.3171*** 0.3164*** 0.3189*** 0.0264***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0156) (0.0014)
Industry-Region characteristics (t-1)
ln(county’s ind conc) 0.0146 -0.0009 -0.0009 0.0053 -0.0007
(0.0224) (0.0225) (0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0021)
ln(regional employment) -0.5870*** -0.4906*** -0.4888*** -0.5878*** -0.0397***
(0.1066) (0.1040) (0.1041) (0.1066) (0.0101)
HHI -0.0001** -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001** -0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
ln(variety price) -0.1210*** -0.1130*** -0.1059*** -0.1208*** -0.0087***
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0021)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) 0.6989*** 0.6653*** 0.6120*** 0.6924*** 0.0595***
(0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0637) (0.0635) (0.0066)
ln(Int Imports Land) 0.2986*** 0.3044*** 0.2944*** 0.3011*** 0.0247***
(0.0236) (0.0237) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0023)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,626 545,988 751,567
# id panels 63,886 63,886 63,827 63,886 110,754
pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.011
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety. Standard
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country
fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. For every column the
Herfindahl index is adjusted to take into account the industry and regional definition employed.
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Table 11: Accounting for firm’s own experience (A)
baseline
experience
product-and-origin product-specific experience source-specific experience time decay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # other same product-
same source importers in the county
0.0504*** 0.0554* 0.0594*** 0.0647*** 0.0485*** 0.0491*** 0.0409*** 0.0429 0.0642
(0.0020) (0.0232) (0.0122) (0.0131) (0.0062) (0.0064) (0.0046) (0.0276) (0.0348)
Firm’s past import experience (t-1)
variety-specific -4.7294*** -3.0345*** -2.6739*** -0.1727 -3.8005***
(0.2891) (0.1409) (0.0936) (0.3779) (0.3282)
product-specific 0.1906**
(0.0652)
product (other sources) 0.6375***
(0.1201)
source-specific 0.5040***
(0.0379)
source (other products) 0.6947***
(0.0420)
firm’s export experience (source-specific) 0.1776***
(0.0400)
time decay of experience
time (i.e. years elapsed since last time the variety
was imported)
2.5125*** 1.2744***
(.1726) (0.1101)
time×product-source-exp -1.8910***
(.1733)
time×Product-Origin Spillover -0.0051
(0.0072)
# Observations 545,988 2,463 12,027 12,027 38,960 38,960 67,961 2,626 2,626
# id panels 63,886 657 2,610 2,610 7,751 7,751 12,364 708 708
pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.311 0.037 0.124 0.028 0.078 0.035 0.532 0.438
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-
product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All
regressions include the full list of controls that are not included in the table for presentational issues
In Column (5), I account for a firm’s source-market specific past experience by including a dummy variable
that takes up the value one if the firm in question has previously imported any product from that source
market, whereas in Column (6), I account both for the firm’s variety-specific import experience and the
firm’s past experience in importing a different 4-digit product code from the same source market. A
firm that has in the past imported a different 4-digit product code from a given source-market it is 17
percentage points more likely to start importing the product-code in question from that source market.
Accounting for a firm’s source-market import experience hardly affects the magnitude of the coefficient
on the product-and-origin specific spillover, and doesn’t impact its significance. In Column (7) I am
looking at firm’s experience of the market via exporting. Exporting, is another way of familiarizing with
a given source market and indeed I find that a firm that has been serving a market via exporting is 4
percentage points more likely to start importing any given intermediate variety from that market.
In the last two columns of Table 11, I explore whether the effect of a firm’s own import experience
exhibits time decay. In Column (8), I include in the controls the time that has elapsed (years) since the
firm last incurred the variety-specific sunk cost (i.e. the last time that the firm switched to importing
a particular variety). Moreover, I interact the time variable with the variable for variety-specific import
experience. For a firm with previous import experience for a given variety, an additional year since the
last variety-specific import switch decreases the chances that this variety will be re-imported by around
50 percentage points. The interaction term is highly significant. In the last column I include the time
variable as well as its interaction with the Product-Origin spillover measure. The interaction term fails
to enter significantly.
In Columns (2) and (3) of Table 12, I account for different measures of the diversity of the firm’s import
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Table 12: Accounting for firms’ experience (B)
baseline
experience
product-specific
scope of
experience
source-specific
scope of
experience
region-wide
scope of
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product - Origin Spillover:# of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0504*** 0.0503*** 0.0498*** 0.0505***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020)
Experience measures (t-1)
# additional sources 0.3300***
(0.0110)
# additional products 0.0954***
(0.0022)
# of distinct varieties imported in the county -0.0001**
(0.0000)
Interaction terms (t-1)
Product Origin-Spill.× #other sources -0.0044*
(0.0018)
Product-Origin-Spill.× #other products -0.0006*
(0.0003)
# Observations 545,988 545,988 545,988 545,988
# id panels 63,886 63,886 63,886 63,886
Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.020 0.030 0.022
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-
product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All
regressions include the full list of controls that are not included in the table for presentational issues
experience; by including as controls the number of other source-markets from which a firm imports the
product in question (2), and the number of other products imported from a specific source market (3).
The former variable captures firm-level product-related experience as well as within-product category
scope economies across different source markets. The latter is capturing origin-specific information or
scope economies across products. A firm importing a particular product from one additional source, is
8 percentage points more likely to start importing that product from any other source market. A firm
importing one additional product from any given market is 2.4 percentage points more likely to start
importing a specific product that is not already purchased from that market. Note that, despite their
importance, including these variables doesn’t affect the coefficient of the spillover variable. In Column
(4) I am taking into account the diversity of the regional import experience by including in the controls
a variable that counts the number of distinct varieties imported by all other firms in the county. This
variable although highly significant hardly matters for the individual import decisions as the coefficient’s
order of magnitude is very small. The negative sign of the coefficient could be reflecting regional crowding
out effects. The inclusion of measures of firm’s experience hardly affect the magnitude or significance of
the spillover variable.
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Table 13: Different specifications and subsamples (A)
VARIABLES baseline
as lhs
instead of switch
import status
histories
fully observed import
restrict sample to
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product - Origin spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0504*** 0.0496*** 0.0486***
(0.0020) (0.0017) (0.0051)
lagged import status 0.6188***
(0.0078)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(employment) 0.6184*** 0.5955*** 0.5158***
(0.0146) (0.0121) (0.0301)
ln(avg wage) 0.0051 -0.0362* -0.0547
(0.0203) (0.0171) (0.0356)
export status (dest. specific) 0.3101*** 0.2186*** 0.1949***
(0.0163) (0.0133) (0.0418)
BG affil. 0.0460* 0.0269 -0.0342
(0.0184) (0.0152) (0.0443)
ln(VA per worker) 0.3178*** 0.3131*** 0.3294***
(0.0156) (0.0130) (0.0306)
Industry-Region characteristics (t-1)
HHI -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0002)
ln(county’s ind conc) 0.0146 0.0429* -0.1448*
(0.0224) (0.0185) (0.0583)
ln(regional employment) -0.5870*** -0.5227*** -1.9251***
(0.1066) (0.0883) (0.2851)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
ln(variety price) -0.1210*** -0.1241*** -0.0905
(0.0225) (0.0186) (0.0637)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) 0.6989*** 0.6097*** 1.8653***
(0.0635) (0.0522) (0.1947)
ln(Int Imports Land) 0.2986*** 0.2598*** 0.2011**
(0.0236) (0.0194) (0.0773)
# Observations 545,988 712,847 65,875
# id panels 63,886 74,050 11,858
pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.032 0.035
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-
product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
4.5.2 Robustness to different specifications and different subsamples
I investigate whether my findings are contigent on the choice of preferred specification and whether
they are robust to using different subsamples/specifications. In Table 13, the first column repeats the
benchmark specification. The second column uses the product-and-country specific import status instead
of the switch variable as the LHS variable. Results survive the alternative specification and the coefficient
on the Product-Origin Spillover is highly significant and of a broadly similar magnitude34. In the third
column, I restrict the working sample to firms whose full import history can be observed. These would
be firms that first appear in my data after year 2000. Results are robust to this exercise as well. In
Table 14, I present an additional set of robustness checks. Column (2) repeats the baseline specification
34Under this specification, to distinguish between firms that now incur the fixed entry cost associated with importing and
firms that have already incurred it I also control for the lagged import status. Including the lagged import status poses
serial correlation concerns that are taken into account in the estimation routine.
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Table 14: Different specifications and subsamples (B)
baseline
inputs
to most important
restrict attention
origins
to most important
restrict attention
HQ’s region
neighbors in
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product - Origin spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0504*** 0.0504*** 0.0451***
(0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0027)
Product-Origin Spillover: # other same product-
same source importers in the HQ’s county
0.0507***
(0.0020)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(employment) 0.6184*** 0.6184*** 0.6421*** 0.6096***
(0.0146) (0.0146) (0.0178) (0.0143)
ln(avg wage) 0.0051 0.0051 0.0229 0.0093
(0.0203) (0.0203) (0.0250) (0.0200)
export status (dest. specific) 0.3101*** 0.3101*** 0.3490*** 0.3092***
(0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0195) (0.0161)
BG affi 0.0460* 0.0460* 0.0582** 0.0466*
(0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0226) (0.0182)
ln(VA per worker) 0.3178*** 0.3178*** 0.3456*** 0.3151***
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0190) (0.0153)
Industry-Region characteristics (t-1)
HHI -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001** -0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
ln(county’s ind conc) 0.0146 0.0146 0.0050 0.0053
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0274) (0.0219)
ln(regional employment) -0.5870*** -0.5870*** -0.5834*** -0.2490***
(0.1066) (0.1066) (0.1302) (0.0753)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
ln(variety price) -0.1210*** -0.1210*** -0.1054*** -0.1189***
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0269) (0.0223)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) 0.6989*** 0.6989*** 0.8825*** 0.7037***
(0.0635) (0.0635) (0.0776) (0.0629)
ln(Int Imports Land) 0.2986*** 0.2986*** 0.1392*** 0.3062***
(0.0236) (0.0236) (0.0282) (0.0234)
# of (other) same variety importers in the region
ProductCountryspillover # Observations
545,988 545,988 362,087 556,425
# id panels 63,886 63,886 44,477 65,226
pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.020
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-
product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
but restricting attention only to each firm’s most important inputs, i.e. inputs for which the firm-specific
import share is above the median imported input share for the firm. Column (3) in turn, restricts attention
to each firm’s most important trade partners . These sample restrictions hardly affect the coefficients or
the significance of the spillover variables. In the last column I enlarge the sample to include both single
plant and multi plant firms. For the latter group, the spillover variable is instead constructed at the HQ’s
neighborhood. Results are not affected, which implies that the import relevant information generated
at the plant-level is also weighing on the firm’s decision and that the flow of intra-firm import-relevant
information is not strictly top-to-down.
Further results and robustness checks are presented in Table 15. In Column (2), the baseline specification
is used but the estimation now relies on a fixed effects linear probability model. The spillover coefficient
remains highly significant in this specification as well though the implied magnitudes differ. Columns (3)
and (4) employ different definitions for the product and country specific spillover measure. In Column
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(3), the spillover measure is expressed as a ratio rather than level. Hence the spillover variable stands
for the share of same variety importing firms in the county. A marginal increase in the ratio of same
variety market importers in the county leads to an increase in the probability of starting to import that
same intermediate variety of around 16 percentage points. In Column (4), the number of importers is
normalized by the county’s area expressed in square kilometers, i.e. the density of same variety importers
in the county. A marginal increase in the density of same variety market importers leads to an increase
of the order of 6.9 percentage points in the probability to start importing that particular variety.
In Column (5), I examine how strict is the product-specificity dimension of the spillover effect. I therefore
include in the baseline specification, along with the number of same (4-digit) product and source market
importers in the county, the number of firms that import a variety that falls in the same but broader
(2-digit) product category (yet is different from the 4-digit one). This term is also highly significant
but negligible in magnitude compared to the benchmark spillover measure, suggesting that informational
transfers are specific in nature and exhibit decay as we consider them in a broader product context.
In Column (6), I consider an alternative specification and use as my LHS variable the probability to stop
importing a particular variety in period t, if this was being imported in t − 1. The coefficient on the
spillover variable enters with a negative sign and is significant at the 1% level. One more neighbor in
the county importing that same input variety implies that an individual firm is by 0.8 percentage points
less likely to discontinue the use of that variety in its production process at time t. This result can be
interpreted as spillovers being conducive to more long-lasting import decisions. A potential explanation
is that this type of informational transactions is also operating via lowering per period fixed import costs
hence facilitating the duration of the product-and-country specific import transactions.
The last column, (7) restricts the sample to durable starts only, i.e. switches that lead to imports of
varieties that persist for at least three consecutive periods. Results are hardly affected, allowing me to
conclude that it is less likely that the results presented so far are primarily driven by occasional imports,
which are in turn more prone to be the result of reactions to common shocks, a crucial endogeneity threat
discussed in the next section.
4.6 Spillovers or Common Shocks?
As it has already been discussed, the identification of spillovers is quite challenging from an econometric
perspective. Though I have already taken steps to address the concerns raised in Section 3.2, in the
absence of an exogenous variation in the data, a lingering concern is whether what is being captured by the
estimation process is merely a response to common shocks. The baseline specification includes year effects
that should be picking up shocks that are common to all firms across industries and regions irrespective
of what input they import and what country they import it from. Year effects will be capturing shocks
like the the 2007 financial crisis, the Euro Area crisis in 2010, changes in Sweden’s trade policy or trade
relations, economy-wide macroeconomic shocks etc.). What year effects will not correct is endogeneity
arising from the following types of shocks.
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Table 15: Different specifications and subsamples (C)
baseline logit sed in shares
spillover expres-
county’s area
lized by the
spillover norma-
definition
broader product
as lhs
drop variety
probability to
starts (3yrs)
to durable
restrict sample
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # of (other) same variety
importers in the region
0.0504*** 0.0050*** 0.0410*** -0.0342*** 0.0410***
(0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0033) (0.0056) (0.0019)
Product-and-Country-specific regional spillover: %
share of other importing firm
0.6852***
(0.0310)
Product-Country Spillover (density, importers per
km2)
0.2792***
(0.0131)
# of firms in the county importing the same 2-digit
but a different 4-dig product (from the same market)
0.0063***
(0.0010)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(employment) 0.6184*** 0.0536*** 0.6178*** 0.5838*** 0.4180*** -0.3565*** 0.4656***
(0.0146) (0.0013) (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0285) (0.0459) (0.0138)
ln(avg wage) 0.0051 0.0015 0.0056 0.0561* 0.0665 0.3075*** 0.0101
(0.0203) (0.0019) (0.0203) (0.0264) (0.0403) (0.0577) (0.0205)
export status (dest. specific) 0.3101*** 0.0283*** 0.3109*** 0.2957*** 0.1323*** 0.0320 0.2774***
(0.0163) (0.0015) (0.0163) (0.0209) (0.0254) (0.0394) (0.0159)
BG affi 0.0460* 0.0049** 0.0469* 0.0535* 0.0229 0.0217 0.0326
(0.0184) (0.0018) (0.0184) (0.0239) (0.0324) (0.0516) (0.0179)
ln(VA per worker) 0.3178*** 0.0265*** 0.3159*** 0.2509*** 0.1155*** -0.3740*** 0.2347***
(0.0156) (0.0014) (0.0156) (0.0194) (0.0276) (0.0413) (0.0151)
Industry-Region characteristics (t-1)
HHI -0.0001** -0.0000*** -0.0001** -0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0001 -0.0001**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
ln(county’s ind conc) 0.0146 0.0012 0.0158 0.0430 -0.0419 -0.1215 -0.0003
(0.0224) (0.0022) (0.0224) (0.0335) (0.0381) (0.0623) (0.0218)
ln(regional employment) -0.5870*** -0.0515*** -0.5744*** -0.7194*** -1.0141*** 0.7876* -0.4909***
(0.1066) (0.0107) (0.1067) (0.1612) (0.1812) (0.3059) (0.1038)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
ln(variety price) -0.1210*** -0.0104*** -0.1208*** -0.1047** -0.1202** 0.1264 -0.1027***
(0.0225) (0.0021) (0.0225) (0.0385) (0.0402) (0.0648) (0.0221)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) 0.6989*** 0.0645*** 0.7096*** 0.3492*** -0.3043** 1.0716*** 0.8557***
(0.0635) (0.0067) (0.0635) (0.0856) (0.1160) (0.2365) (0.0611)
ln(Int Imports Land) 0.2986*** 0.0264*** 0.2961*** 0.2387*** 0.3220*** 0.4066*** 0.1971***
(0.0236) (0.0023) (0.0236) (0.0357) (0.0452) (0.0759) (0.0230)
# Observations 545,988 751,567 545,988 296,486 156,813 70,178 581,065
# id panels 63,886 110,754 63,886 38,957 25,225 19,041 63,722
pseudo R-squared 0.021 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.012 0.105 0.012
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-
product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
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Regional/sectoral shocks: Consider shocks that asymmetrically affect a region (natural disaster,
county-level reform etc) or a sector (e.g. sector-specific reform). These shocks would affect import
decisions of all firms within a given region or industry, irrespective of what they want to import and
where they consider importing it from. Such unobserved shocks would bias the estimation of spillovers.
I control for such events by including year effects with a regional and a sectoral dimension.
Industry or county specific demand shocks: It may be the case that all firms in a given industry
k or region r (or their intersection) are hit by a productivity or production-process specific shock that
affects their ability to produce and consequently their use of a specific input. If such shocks occur, all
import starts associated with inputs used by the affected firms (irrespective of the source-market) would
be affected. The resulting bias in the estimation of spillovers could be corrected by controlling for such
shocks through year effects with a product-sector, product-county or product-county-sector dimension
respectively. Import spillovers are then identified on the heterogeneity across destinations within a given
product-sector-year, product-county-year or product-county-sector-year.
Source-market specific supply shocks: Consider a shock that affects the supply capacity of inter-
mediate producers of input g in country c35. Such events (e.g. new aggressive trade union leadership
organizes a prolonged strike) are unlikely to affect Swedish firms that are located in different counties or
that operate in different industries unevenly, hence the inclusion of source-market-product-year effects
should therefore account for the endogeneity threats posed by similar shocks. Spillovers are then identi-
fied on the variation of import switches across Swedish counties and across manufacturing sectors within
a given variety-market and year. Product-origin year effects also control for shocks of lower dimensions
i.e. shocks that affect a particular product (e.g. the discovery of a new production method) or shocks
that are specific to a particular source-market, (like for example the Fukushima earthquakes in Japan in
2010 that severely disrupted Japan’s economic activity.)
Shocks specific to a county and a source-market: Events like the opening of a trade promotion
office or a subdivision of a trade chamber in a specific county, or even the acquisition of a local firm
by a business group from a particular country, the installation of a group of immigrants in the area,
the hiring of a foreign manager by a local firm, the construction of new infrastructure like the Oresund
Bridge, etc are events that can affect the dynamics of bilateral trade relationships between a region and
a source-market. The product-province year or product-county-year effects discussed above would not
adequately deal with such shocks, hence the inclusion of county-source-market-year effects is warranted.
Shocks specific to a sector and a source-market: Consider the case that some firm in Germany
pioneers by introducing a new version of an input g that is intensively used in industry k. This will affect
the decision of firms to start importing that particular input from Germany and such a development could
35Note that the inclusion of total exports of intermediate g from country c to Sweden should also capture supply dynamics
in the source-market.
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be confounded with the presence of spillovers. Adding year effects with sector-source-market dimension
would accommodate such issues.
County-product-source-market-year shocks: It could be the case that these unobserved by the
estimation process shocks are specific to county r, product g, source market k and time t. The addition
of the aforementioned year effects would not account for shocks of similar nature. And yet, introducing
year effects with a couty-product-source-market dimension is not feasible since they would be in the same
dimension as the benchmark spillover measure. Ideally, the spillover variable would be instrumented.
The desired instrumental variable, would be highly correlated with the instrumented variable without
directly affecting the product-source-market specific import decision. Unfortunately such an instrument
proves difficult to identify in such a context as the literature on export spillovers would confirm.
As a further exercise, following Greenaway and Kneller 2008, I separate the agglomeration effects accord-
ing to when entry of peers in the import markets occurred, between contemporaneous and continuing
importers. If the effects are driven by contemporaneous importers then concerns that what we are actu-
ally capturing is the response to some common shock rather than agglomeration effects are accentuated.
As contemporaneous importers I consider the firms that started to import the product-source market
combination in question, at time t or t− 136, whereas continuing importers are the firms that started in
t− 2 or earlier.(To go one step further, I perform an additional exercise and separate the agglomeration
effects arising from occasional versus systematic importers arguing that in case the results are primarily
driven by the former it is again more likely that I am picking up a response driven by favorable conditions,
rather than the results of spillovers.)
While being exposed to the identification concerns that are inherent to this literature, I believe I come as
close to providing evidence on import spillovers as possible. Lacking some truly exogenous variation in
my data, or a reliable instrument though I cannot claim that the import behavior of neighbors (or peers)
has a causal impact on individual import decisions. Nevertheless, results exhibit remarkable resilience
to all discussed robustness controls. The endogneity issues raised above are addressed in In Table 16.
Note that results are robust to the proposed exercises.
5 Theoretical Underpinnings
The effect of peers located in the same region or operating in the same industry on firms’ international
decisions has primarily been studied in an empirical context and from the exporters’ perspective. Within
the export spillovers literature few theoretical insights have been provided. Krautheim, 2008 shows how
informational transactions between firms that export to the same destination lower the individual fixed
costs associated with foreign market entry and increases the probability to export (extensive margin).
Rauch and Watson, 2003 show how the agglomeration of exporters lowers the buyers’ uncertainty over
36Since right hand side variables are lagged by a year that means that in fact ”new” importers are firms that have been
importing that particular product-source market combination for one or two years. Hence continuing importers are the
firms that have been importing that product source market combination for at least three years (or more).
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the quality of their suppliers allowing for larger orders and having a positive impact on the firm-level
intensive margin of trade.
This section aims to provide a theoretical framework to account for the mechanism of import spillovers
on individual firms’ import decisions The main difficulty we face is that as opposed to exporting, inter-
national sourcing affects the firm’s marginal cost of production. In the presence of heterogeneous fixed
costs (either country and/or product specific) the theory features no general predictions for the extensive
margin of importing. Although more productive exporters are known to export more products to more
markets than their less productive competitors -see Eaton , Kortum, and Kramarz (2011): Arkolakis and
Muendler (2011); Tintelnot (2012); Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2010)- a similar conclusion cannot be
drawn with certainty in the case of importing.
The reason is that import decisions feature interdependencies that arise from the complementarities
between inputs in the firms’ production process. Contrary to the general approach in the exporting
literature, firms’ entry decisions in the case of importing cannot be viewed in isolation, which in turn,
has interesting implications for the theoretical mechanisms through which import spillovers operate.
The particularities of modeling the import decision have been formalized in two recent papers. Antras,
Fort and, Tintelnot (2014) study the extensive and intensive margins of firms’ global sourcing decisions
developing a quantifiable multi-country sourcing model that features selection into importing. Imposing
parametric restrictions the model delivers the the strict hierarchical structure present in models of ex-
porting. Their quantitative analysis allows them to distinguish between country’s potential as a marginal
cost reducing source of inputs and the fixed costs associated with sourcing intermediates from that coun-
try. Blaum, Lelarge and, Peters (2013) develop a general framework nesting most of existing theoretical
frameworks of importing. They establish that the theory yields no general predictions for the extensive
margin of importing but obtain a testable prediction of the homotheticity of import demand at the in-
tensive margin, which they go on to test for French firm-level data.
I build on these two frameworks and draw the modeling of spillovers from Krautheim 2008 and derive a
testable prediction (1) for the knife-edge case where parameter values allow for a sharp characterization
of the import decision as in this case sourcing decisions are independent across intermediate varieties. I
then depart from this case and establish some useful results for the interaction of agglomeration effects
and firms’ international sourcing decisions that will for the basis of my future research.
5.1 Preferences
The representative consumer’s preferences are defined over the consumption of a homogeneous good
(qcα), produced in the ”agricultural” (i.e. external sector), as well as the consumption of a composite
manufacturing good (QcM )
37. The upper tier utility has a Cobb Douglas form:
Uc = (q
c
α)
1−η(QcM )
η (4)
37Assume that the share 1 − η of the external sector in consumption is large enough to ensure that this good will be
produced in all countries in an open economy equilibrium
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The representative consumer’s preferences for manufacturing goods are defined over the consumption of
differentiated (local) varieties of manufactured goods according to a standard symmetric CES aggregator.
QcM =
(∫
ω∈Ωc
= q(ω)
σ−1
σ dω
) σ
σ−1
(5)
Where Ωc is the of available varieties to country c
′s consumers. In the benchmark case there is no
international trade in final goods varieties. Solution to the consumer’s problem yields the following
demand for variety ω in country c.
qc(ω) = EcP
σ−1
c pc(ω)
−σ (6)
where pc(ω) is the price of local variety ω, charged in the local market c, P
σ−1
c is the ideal price index
associated with (5), and Ec stands for the aggregate spending on manufacturing goods in country c which
from the solution of the upper tier utility problem is equal to ηwcLc. I will also define a market demand
term Bc for market c as follows:
Bc =
1
σ
(
σ
σ − 1)
1−σEcPσ−1c (7)
5.2 Production Technology and Market Structure
Labor is the only factor of production. The following three sectors operate in each economy c ∈ C:
Non-manufacturing (numraire):
This sector is operating under perfect competition and produces a homogeneous good that is freely traded
between countries. Assuming that this sector is active in all countries, i.e. 1 − η is high enough, free
trade leads to price equalization and pins down relative wages to relative productivities in this sector.
Introducing this sector allows us to abstain from endogenous wage determination.
Intermediate goods sector:
Let K be the set of globally available intermediate inputs. All intermediates are produced with labour
as their only input subject to the country specific technology under perfect competition. The model
distinguishes between products and varieties. Varieties are differentiated by their country of origin within
the same product class. Hence, the term variety refers to a product-country pair. 38 Intermediate input
varieties are internationally traded and are subject to both variable (iceberg type, τ > 1) and fixed costs.
Firms are price-takers and the price of each variety r = c, k that firms in the home country h face is:
phr = τhcarwc, where τhc > 1 is the iceberg transportation cost for firms in h to source any good from
country c, ar is the unit labour cost reflected in country c
′s technology for the production of product k,
and wc is the prevailing wage rate in country c.
Final goods sector:
There exists a measure of Nc final-good producers in each country c ∈ C and each of these producers
owns a blueprint that entitles them to the production of a single differentiated variety. Firms in the
38Note that, in the absence of a nested production function, in the current version, there is no effective distinction between
products and varieties. Each product-country combination is treated as a distinct product in its own right.
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final-goods sector operate in monopolistic competition.
Production of final-good varieties requires the assembly of a bundle of intermediate varieties. Intermediate
varieties are thought of as product-and-country combinations. Intermediate varieties can be sourced either
locally or from abroad. A key feature of the equilibrium will be determining the bundle of intermediate
varieties. The bundle consists of a symmetric CES aggregator over imperfectly substitutable intermediate
varieties, with a constant and symmetric elasticity of substitution equal to % > 1.
Iic(I(φ)) =
( ∑
j∈Iic(φ)
(ηicjxicj)
%−1
%
) %
%−1
(8)
Iic(I(φ)) is the composite intermediate bundle as it has been assembled by firm i located in country c.
The assembly of the bundle consists in the determination of the firm-specific ”sourcing strategy”, i.e. the
determination of the extensive margin of sourcing. Think of ηicj as parametrizing firm specific ”quality”
attributes attached to a particular variety j. Another way to consider ηicj as parametrizing the degree
of compatibility of variety j with firm i′s production process. xicj denotes firm i′s located in country c
demand for variety j. Variety j refers to the product-country pair k, c′ where k ∈ K and c′ ∈ C. K refers
to the set of intermediate products (with n elements).
The firm’s production technology is summarized by:
fic(φ) =
1
φ
Iic(I(φ)) (9)
φ denotes firms’ core productivity which governs the mapping between the equilibrium bundle of inputs
and the production of final varieties. The Melitz timing applies. After incurring a fixed entry cost
that is thereafter considered sunk, firms are entitled to a draw from a common (within each country)
productivity distribution (that is assumed to be Pareto with curvature κ > σ − 1 and φmin = 1).
Since the focus of the paper is on the determinants of the composition if the bundle, we mute the other
factors of production (labor). Final-goods producers only indirectly employ labour. Hence, the firms’
core productivity phi governs the mapping between the bundle and final production. For simplicity, we
assume away trade in final varieties.
The firm’s problem
The firm’s problem consists in choosing the scale of production (under monopolistic competition firms
production is residually determined by demand for their products that is taken as given, hence firms choose
instead their price) and optimally assemble their intermediate varieties bundle, in order to maximize their
profits.
It is convenient to split the firm’s problem into (a) describe firm’s profit maximizing behavior given its
optimal sourcing strategy (and demand for its output) and (b) characterize the choice of the optimal
sourcing strategy given the firm’s cost function.
Definition 1 The firm’s sourcing strategy describes the firm’s decisions on the assembly of their com-
posite intermediate bundle, in other words, the firm-level decisions as to which product-country pairs to
include in their intermediate bundle, i.e. the firms’ extensive margins of sourcing. More precisely a
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sourcing strategy Iic(φ) is a subset of the global space of intermediate varieties (n×m elements).
Firm behavior conditional on a sourcing strategy Firms are subject to a profit maximizing
behavior. Firm i with productivity φ located in country c maximizes the following objective profit
function:
piic(φ, Iic(φ)) = pic(φ)qic(φ)− Cic(φ, Iic(φ))qic(φ)− wc
∑
j∈Iic(φ)
fj(Ncj) (10)
where piic(φ, Iic(φ)) denotes the profits of firm i with productivity φ operating in country c, each firm
i from c with productivity φ then charges price pic(φ) for the final variety it produces, taking demand
for this final variety to be given (qic(φ) is the solution to the consumer’s problem). Then, Cic(φ, Iic(φ))
denotes the marginal cost faced by firm i from country c with productivity φ given its sourcing strategy
Iic(φ). Note that in the presence of spillovers fixed costs will be a function of same variety importers in
the country.
Solution to this problem gives rise to the following standard form results for the firm’s profit-maximizing
price:
pic(φ) =
σ
σ − 1Cic(φ, Iic(φ)) (11)
Replacing for (11) in (10) the profit function shall read:
piic(φ, Iic(φ)) = BcCic(φ, Iic(φ))1−σ − wc
∑
j∈Iic(φ)
fj(Ncj) (12)
Optimal import demand The marginal rate of substitution between any two intermediate varieties
j, j′:
xicj
xicj′
=
( pj
pj′
)−σ( ηicj
ηicj′
)σ−1
(13)
Note that by allowing variety qualities to be firm specific, the marginal rate of substitution between
distinct intermediate varieties depends not only on product characteristics but on product-firm charac-
teristics. It is useful to define the term ξicj as the ”quality flow” per dollar spent on variety j, that is also
known as ”pure price” of variety j. The ”quality flow” per dollar spent on variety j can also be thought
to reflect that variety’s ”sourcing potential”.
ξicj ≡ ηicj
pcj
(14)
Letting xicj(φ, Iic(φ)) stand for the optimal demand of firm i from c for variety j, we define the optimal
share of intermediate input variety j purchases as:
xicjpcj∑
j∈Iic(φ)
xicjpcj
=
ξ%−1∑
j∈Iic(φ)
ξ%−1
(15)
It will be useful to define the denominator in (16) as Θic(φ, Iic(φ)) denoting what we shall refer to as the
firm’s ”sourcing capability”. Then note that each variety’s share in firm’s total intermediate purchases
corresponds in effect to that variety’s contribution to its sourcing capability. Hence, varieties yielding a
higher quality flow, i.e. characterized by a higher sourcing potential are expected to have higher input
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shares in the aggregate input purchases of that firm.
xicjpcj∑
j∈Iic(φ)
xicjpcj
=
ξ%−1
Θic(φ, Iic(φ))
(16)
Marginal Cost The margin cost reads:
Cic(φ, Iic(φ)) = 1
φ
(
Θic(φ, Iic(φ))
) 1
1−%
(17)
The firm’s optimal sourcing strategy (characterizing the extensive margin) The firm’s opti-
mal sourcing strategy is the solution to the following problem:
max
Icr∈{0,1}Rr=1
pic(φ, Ic1, ...) = φ
σ−1
(∑
r∈R
Icrξ
%−1
r
)σ−1
ρ−1
Bc − wc
∑
r∈R
Icrfcr(Ncr) (18)
Properties of the profit function:
• σ−1
ρ−1 > 1: increasing differences give rise to complementarities across decisions
• σ−1
ρ−1 < 1: decreasing differences, decisions are substitutes.
• σ−1
ρ−1 = 1: independent decisions
The following propositions can be established:
Proposition 2 The solution to the optimal sourcing strategy problem is such that the firm’s sourcing capability
Θc(φ) is non decreasing in φ. Note that this is true irrespective of the value of
σ−1
ρ−1 but it doesn’t imply that more
productive firms source more varieties
Proposition 3 In the presence of complementarities the solution to the optimal sourcing strategy problem delivers
a pecking order in the extensive margin of sourcing Ic(φ
L) ⊆ Ic(φH)ifφL ≤ φH
Assuming that parameters satisfy requirements so that the model features complementarities between the import
decisions and further assuming that the available intermediate varieties can be uniquely ranked for all the firms
in terms of an index of ”sourcing appeal”, the measure of firms sourcing a particular variety will be increasing
in that index.
Proposition 4 A firm’s sourcing capability and hence its marginal cost depend on the ranking of the varieties
and therefore on the ”sourcing appeal” index
In such an environment firm with productivity φ will include variety r in its sourcing strategy iff
φσ−1cr
(
Θcr(φ)
σ−1
ρ−1 −Θcr−1(φ)
σ−1
ρ−1
)
Bc ≥ wcfcr(Ncr) (19)
In the knife-edge case where σ−1
ρ−1 = 1 (19) becomes:
φσ−1cr ξ
ρ−1Bc − wcfcr(Ncr) ≥ 0 (20)
This is the observed part of the additional profit accruing to the firm from including variety j in ints sourcing
strategy. It comprises of firm, variety and market specific variables and provides the basis of our testable prediction
in 1 The model is characterized by free entry:
∫ inf
φc
φσ−1BcΘc(φ)
A − wc
∑
r∈R
fcr(Ncr)dGc(φ) = wcfec (21)
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The modeling of spillovers draws on Krautheim, 2013. Fixed costs faced by a firm in country c importing variety
r to decrease with an elasticity β < σ−1
κ
< 1 in the number of firms in the country sourcing that same variety,
where β stands for the strength of spillovers and δr is the variety specific, information decay.
fcr = f˜cr(δrNcr)
−β (22)
Combining 19, 21 and 22 yields the equilibrium expressions for the variety-specific productivity cut-off φr, the
market demand term Bc and the number of entrants Nc. We therefore have that:
φ∗r =
[wc
Bc
f˜cr(δrNc)
−β
∆ΘAcr
] 1
σ−1−κβ
(23)
Bc =
(
fec
κ− σ + 1
σ − 1
)σ−1−κβ
κ(1−β)
N
−β(κ−σ+1)
κ(1−β)
c wc
( ∑
r′∈R
(∆ΘAcr′)
κ(1−β)
σ−1−κβ
(δ−βr′ fcr
′)
κ−σ+1
σ−1−κβ
)−(σ−1−κβ)
κ(1−β)
(24)
and,
Nc =
σ − 1
κσ
ηLc
fec
(25)
It is straightforward that the following two facts can be established:
Proposition 5 Spillovers magnify the reaction of the cutoffs to changes in the fixed costs (holding the market
demand term constant).
Proposition 6 Taking into account the reaction of the demand term to in the fixed costs of sourcing tampers the
cutoff’s reaction. The magnitude of the scaling effect of spillovers determines the outcome.
From a policy perspective the following consideration worths further attention. In the absence of differences in the
fixed costs of sourcing (same for all varieties), then irrespective of the value of σ−1
ρ−1 > 1, varieties will be ranked
in terms of their sourcing potential. Firms include first in their sourcing strategy varieties associated with the
highest sourcing capability, i.e. firms that yield the highest marginal benefits. Variety specific fixed costs insert a
distortion in the ranking as when faced with every import decisions firms trade off the accruing benefit and the
incremental fixed cost associated with sourcing this variety. Without imposing any restrictions on the relationship
between a variety’s sourcing capability and the respective fixed cost the following inefficiency may arise. High
sourcing capability varieties may be crowded out by relatively less attractive varieties on the basis of accessibility,
i.e. because they bear lower fixed costs. The presence of spillovers featuring variety specific components can
further distort the order of sourcing. Such inefficiencies are of interest because of their implications for the firms’
sourcing capability, marginal costs and eventually the equilibrium price index.
6 Conclusions
In this paper I investigate the relevance and explore the nature of import spillovers on the firms’ decision to start
importing, using an exceptionally detailed data set on Swedish firms’ imports, at the product-level and by source-
country, spanning the period between 1997 and 2011. This paper bridges the gap in the literature and further
contributes to the understanding of import spillovers by laying out a theoretical framework that formalizes the
main forces at play. I find that the number of same variety importers in the firm’s neighborhood, is associated with
a higher probability to start importing that same product-source market pair. Spillovers on the import decision
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appear to be very specific in nature suggesting that the relevant information is attached to the characteristics of
the particular intermediate and the market from which it is imported. I find evidence of spillovers both at the
regional but also at the industry level. There is however evidence that intra-industry spillovers are reinforced by
physical proximity suggesting that learning from competitors’ international activities (importing in particular)
is facilitated when they are geographically close and hence directly observable. Furthermore, spillovers seem to
matter more for the decision to source intermediates from less familiar source-markets. Same-variety importers
in the firm’s region that feature higher productivity and organizational similarities with the firm weigh more in
its import decisions. Results are robust to accounting for firm and region characteristics believed to influence the
import decision.
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Appendices
A.0 Difficulties of International Sourcing
According to analysis of an interview survey of Swedish companies undertaken by the National Board of Trade39
the main problems40 reported by Swedish importers relate to: customs procedures, difficulties with payments
and logistics, regulatory frameworks and technical barriers to trade. An indicative list of the difficulties with
the highest share of positive responses includes product requirements, testing and certification and document
requirements. Similar concerns are highlighted by the Canadian Board of Trade that lists legal considerations,
import/export restrictions at either end of the transaction, whether technical standards in your supplier’s country
meet Canadian requirements, intellectual property rights, language differences, payment methods, understanding
the business and social practices of the origin market, and identifying foreign suppliers as the main challenges of
international sourcing. The respective government support services for the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland
put forward the same list of concerns.
A.1 Data Appendix
The empirical analysis utilizes access to data provided by Statistics Sweden (S.C.B.) covering the universe of firms
in the Firms’ Registry (Foretagsregistret) and spanning the period from 1997 - 2011. As already mentioned in
Section 2, this is an exceptionally detailed data set providing information about each firm’s unique identification
number, its location, a variety of firm characteristics and firm performance measures, as well as its international
activities (importing and exporting) at the product - country level.
As the research question is to investigate agglomeration effects on firms’ demand for intermediate inputs, the anal-
ysis focuses on manufacturing firms41 only, and on product codes corresponding to broad economic classification
categories (BEC) 2 and 4 (i.e. industrial supplies and capital goods). Manufacturing firms represent 7.3% of the
firms in the Registry data, whereas after dropping products not falling within the two aforementioned categories
I am left with 891 unique product codes (down from 1250).
Data are cleaned for inconsistencies. I therefore drop firms with gaps in their observed histories42, firms declaring
negative sales, or reporting negative/zero employment levels43 at any point of their history.
Apart from these basic consistency checks, additional restrictions include dropping firms that change location
and/or industry over the time period covered44. Doing so enhances the credibility of my data (in case the
movement corresponds to a reporting mistake or an immaterial move of the headquarter), allows me to avoid
dealing with more confounding factors associated with firms’ endogenous change of location or activity and grants
me the additional benefit that the triadic firm-product-country fixed effects that are employed in my baseline
39Kommerskollegium
40problems refer to importing from non-EU countries
41The manufacturing sector spans the industry classification codes (SNI) 10-33 according to the 2007 nomenclature
revision.
42I wouldn’t be able to identify switches in their import behavior in the presence of gaps
43Negative employment, like negative sales are clearly incidents of misreporting. There is a limited number of firms that
register negative sales in the time frame covered and no firms registering negative employment. There are however many
firms with zero employees. In theory, these are firms where the owner is the only employee. The reason for this restriction
is that these firms may in fact be shadow firms set up for tax avoidance reasons or ancillary activities.
44As far as single-plant firms are concerned then these firms are completely dropped if there is a change in their location
or industry classification. In the case of multi-plant firms I only drop the plants that change location and/or industry.
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specification will also be capturing region as well as sector time invariant unobservable characteristics.
When analyzing firms’ decisions to import intermediates from abroad, one potential problem is the presence of
firms that engage in ”processing trade”. In exchange for a fee these firms import, further process and then
re-export goods that remain the property of a foreign party throughout. Processing trade poses problems for two
main reasons. First, the observed import behavior of these firms is rather distinct as it associates with the firm’s
decision to place itself in a global value chain, and, as a result may be blurring my results on spillovers. Second,
processing trade is a source of measurement error. Since the processing firm doesn’t own, purchase or sell the
underlying products for its own account, these flows don’t appear in the firm’s balance sheets. They do however
appear in the trade data. Consequently, on several occasions, the value of imported intermediates as measured
by the customs data is higher than the value of intermediate purchases given by the firm’s balance sheets. The
risk of the measurement error, is not so much of a concern in this context, since I am focusing on the extensive
margin of importing. Focusing on manufacturing firms only limits the presence of processing firms45. I also drop
from my sample firms that in a given year, both import and export a given product code (resellers). Moreover, I
drop imports of intermediate varieties that are likely to be globally supplied by a unique producer46.
I focus on the import decisions of Swedish-owned firms only, on the grounds that the determinants of foreign
firms’ import behavior may be materially different as these firms are likely to be more integrated with global
markets through their parent firm. What is more, from a data perspective I wouldn’t be able to distinguish
between imports and intra-group purchases from the parent or other affiliates based abroad. This is also true for
Swedish international firms, i.e. Swedish firms that have presence abroad. Swedish-owned firms represent 99.4%
of the firms in the registry and 98.7% of manufacturing firms.
In the baseline specification, I limit my attention to investigating how local and sectoral import patterns affect the
import decisions of single-plant firms. Import-export data are at the firm level, matching each transaction with
the identification number of the importing firm without specifying the exact establishment to which imports are
destined. This is naturally a disadvantage when the research question addressed is the analysis of local spillovers,
since the agglomeration variables measure the number of importing neighbors in the vicinity of the establishment
facing the import decision, which clearly poses a problem with multi-plants firms4748.
There are two ways to deal with this problem. The first and most straightforward is to focus on single-plant
firms. The second, is to compute the spillover variable in the neighborhood of the headquarters assuming that
all importing decisions are taken at the headquarter-level and that all imports end up in the headquarter. Here
the former approach is chosen as the benchmark specification, while the latter is also considered as part of the
robustness checks.
45According to the Eurostat definition the coverage of the manufacturing sector consists of units that process their own
materials, subcontract a part of the processing of their own materials, own legal rights and concepts of the product but
subcontract the whole processing, or carry out the aforementioned subcontracted processes. Assembly of the component
parts (whether self-produced or purchased) of manufactured products is also considered manufacturing. Although a manu-
facturing firm can be a processing firm it has to own part of its inputs to be classified as a manufacturer.
46I identify these instances as transactions where all firms in Sweden import a product from a single country
47The distinction between multi-plant and single-plant firms is based on the notion of the ”local kind-of-activity unit”.
The term KAU (kind of activity unit or Verksamhetsenhet, VE) groups all the parts of an enterprise contributing to the
performance of an activity at the 4-digit level of NACE and corresponds to one or more operational subdivisions of the
enterprise. KAUs are the minimum organizational levels for which information about the production value, intermediate
consumption, manpower costs, operating surplus, employment and GFCF are available. The term local KAU, refers to the
part of the KAU that corresponds to a local unit. The Swedish term is ”Lokal Verksamhetsenhet” (LVE in abbreviation).
The concept of the local KAU is not exactly that of the plant, which is better summarized by the variable ”Arbetstallet”,
i.e. worksite, although according to the S.C.B. for most firms these two different entities in fact coincide.
48Note however that in each location I consider units belonging to the same firm as one single entity. Hence in the
construction of the spillover variables different plants or rather activity units of the same firm located in the same region
are only counted once when computing the number of neighbors.
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This choice is motivated by at least two reasons. To start with, given that Sweden is a small open economy, not
surprisingly, the great majority of firms are indeed single-plant firms. In fact, 97.3% of all firms in the registry
and 99% of manufacturers are single-plant firms. The second reason is that the alternative approach relies on
reasonable, albeit strong assumptions about how firms’ import decisions interact with the organizational structure
49. Assuming that the decision for any plant to start importing is taken at the headquarter level hence spillovers
matter only in the headquarter’s neighborhood, implies a top-down flow of import relevant information between
the different units of the firm50. In Table 14 I take up this alternative, consider both single and multi-plant
firms and use as measures of spillover both the importing neighbors in the region where the plant is placed but
also in the headquarter’s neighbourhood. As it is further discussed in the respective section, the results provide
support for my choice of baseline specification.
Therefore I will be focusing on how proximity to other importing firms affects the decision of individual, Swedish-
owned, manufacturing single-plant firms to start importing a specific product-source-market combination. Note
however that I allow both multi-plant as well as foreign-owned firms to influence the decisions of Swedish single-
plant manufacturing firms by accounting for them in the construction of the spillover variables.
Table A.1.1 presents observations by year for the estimation sample (the unit of observation is the firm-product-
country triad) and alternative samples (firm-product, firm country) and last, observations by year and firm for
the firms in my restricted sample. Tables A.2.1 and Tables A.1.3 list observations by county and sector
respectively.
Table A.1.1: Summary statistics - observations by year
Year country-year
firm-product-
year
firm-product-
year
firm-country firm-year
1998 91,766 65,544 28,506 8,855
1999 92,562 65,916 28,575 9,007
2000 93,197 63,698 27,656 9,045
2001 89,578 63,538 27,506 9,000
2002 89,177 62,610 26,988 8,987
2004 86,152 61,541 26,654 9,045
2005 86,102 61,660 26,633 9,057
2006 82,850 59,502 25,792 9,034
2007 80,828 58,271 25,404 9,096
2008 78,115 56,493 24,605 8,750
2009 75,096 54,431 23,780 8,711
2010 73,273 53,087 23,445 8,596
2011 72,094 52,233 23,021 8,473
49Why would all imports end up in the headquarters?
50Information is generated at the HQ and diffused to the subunits whereas we don’t allow for information generated at 
the level of a subunit to flow up and blend into decisions taken at the HQ level or affect other organizational units of the 
firm. Although these are definitely interesting aspects of the internal organization of the firm, they are beyond the scope 
of the current study, I therefore prefer to remain agnostic about these questions and try to adopt as few assumptions as 
possible.
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Table A.1.2: Summary statistics - observations by region (county)
County
country-year
firm-product-
year
firm-product-
year
firm-country firm-year
1 165,662 118,741 50,829 18,449
3 18,236 13,414 5,433 2,407
4 24,369 18,210 9,039 3,448
5 51,678 35,458 16,443 5,165
6 117,130 80,110 38,829 10,745
7 44,016 30,599 13,850 4,080
8 29,901 21,029 10,395 3,829
9 1,667 1,384 961 466
10 15,273 11,120 5,348 1,668
12 165,180 114,785 51,384 15,688
13 50,916 36,447 14,331 4,947
14 254,752 183,236 76,704 24,243
17 39,494 28,183 9,911 3,888
18 36,356 25,760 10,625 3,851
19 30,953 22,363 9,117 3,357
20 33,011 25,806 10,952 4,251
21 22,391 17,541 8,203 3,465
22 19,461 14,050 6,058 2,646
23 12,962 10,373 4,740 1,900
24 22,345 16,734 7,827 3,164
25 22,839 18,023 5,829 2,735
A1: Linear specification
In Table A.1.1 I investigate the appropriateness of the linear specification of the spillovers. Column 1, replicates
for comparison, the preferred specification using the most specific import spillover variable. In Column 2, the
sample is restricted to observations for which the number of importers in the area, same product-same destination,
is greater than three. Column 3 uses a dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one importing neighbor.
In Column 4, I investigate the shape of import spillovers by decomposing import activities into dummy signaling
the mere presence of importing firms for a given product-source-market pair, and the total population of same
product-source-market importers in the neighborhood. This decomposition allows us to describe the shape of
import spillovers by disentangling what is due to the scale of the import intensity in the area from the more
general impact of the mere presence of importers. Results show that, both margins have a positive impact on
domestic import switches.
In the last column I use dummies for different levels of the spillover variable. Results confirm the preferred linear
specification since the effect on starting to import of having one neighbor exporting the same product to the same
destination compared to zero (0.1327) is very similar to the effect of having two neighbors instead of one (0.2443),
three instead of two (0.3469) and so on so forth.
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Table A.1.3: Summary statistics - observations by industry (NACE 2)
Sector country-year
firm-product-
year
firm-product-
year
firm-country firm-year
10 48,639 33,162 16,312 5,936
13 80,049 47,993 24,785 4,988
15 10,566 7,184 3,245 687
16 36,777 30,134 15,730 8,626
17 88,399 63,083 29,913 11,702
19 797 552 229 148
20 66,803 43,468 15,529 3,735
22 88,296 60,586 29,676 7,023
23 28,618 20,309 8,479 3,043
24 214,118 168,810 71,989 29,137
26 194,070 130,080 55,413 14,428
28 176,114 131,775 53,308 17,377
29 72,176 54,059 18,051 6,608
31 71,866 51,004 23,494 10,496
37 1,304 1,167 655 458
A2: Use the Employment Area instead of County as a definition
of the ”Region”
The main focus of my analysis is the study of regional spillover effects on the individual firms’ import decisions.
Hence the definition of ”region” is of crucial importance. In the baseline specification, regions coincide with the
counties of Sweden (Swedish: Ln), which are the top-level administrative geographic subdivisions of Sweden.
Sweden is today divided into 21 counties. One could however argue that the appropriate definition of ”region”
should correspond to the concept of employment areas (Swedish: lokala arbetsmarkaden), a non-administrative
geographic classification used by the Statistics Sweden. There are 85 employment areas in Sweden, which are
defined on the basis of workers’ commuting schemes. Because of their economic rather than administrative
definition labour areas are considered as a relevant geographical classification 51.
I examine in Table A.2.1 whether the main results hold once geographic spillover variables and other region-
based variables are constructed using the employment areas instead of the counties. In columns (1)-(4) I regress
the most specific import decision on the four broad measures of geographical spillovers (broken down to their
non-overlapping components). This is in fact, a replication of 3 where the employment areas are used as regions
in the construction of my agglomeration measures. Results are hardly affected. The remaining columns (5),(6),
use the region-industry dimension of spillovers. This is in turn a replication of columns (4),(5) of Table 10.
Results are broadly the same.
51In several papers in the export spillovers literature, employment areas, rather than any type of administrative geographic
disaggregation is used.
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Table A.1.4: Summary statistics - spillover variables
observations
number of mean SD min max
Regional Spillover Measures
General Spillover 124,392 499.99 356.51 10 1094
Product Spillover 124,392 18.2 24.4 0 152
Country Spillover 124,392 158.12 174.8 0 717
Product - Country Spillover 124,392 3.8 7.89 0 80
# importers (same prod. other source) 124,392 33.68 48.98 0 324
# importers (other prod. same source) 124,392 173.71 192.60 0 910
# importers (other prod. other source) 124,392 330.51 260.89 5 1091
Product - Country Spillover (employ-
ment weighed)
124,392 260.47 538.54 0 4945
Sectoral Spillover Measures
Product - Country Spillover 124,392 8.24 15.93 0 181
same ind. and region 124,392 1.01 2.93 0 61
other ind. same region 124,392 2.79 6.34 0 80
other ind. other region 124,392 22.29 33.45 0 258
Spillovers - Decompositions
by level of organization
# of HQs 124,392 3.73 7.74 0 79
# of plants 124,392 .22 .47 0 5
# of single-plant importers 124,392 3.80 7.85 -1 80
# of multi-plant importers 124,392 .003 .056 0 1
by import experience
# of old importers 124,392 1.64 3.70 0 47
# of new importers 124,392 2.18 4.76 0 51
by ownership structure
# of importers, BG 124,392 2.57 5.09 0 50
# of importers, stand alone 124,392 1.23 3.04 0 36
# of importers, Swedish BG 124,392 1.77 3.62 0 34
# of foreign-owned importers 124,392 0.79 1.76 0 17
# of private-owned importers 124,392 1.22 3.01 0 36
# of state-controlled importers 124,392 0.17 0.14 0 2
by export activity
# of exporters 124,392 3.17 6.37 0 60
# of non-exporters 124,392 0.64 1.78 0 25
Spillover Measures, other defini-
tions
General Spillover (share) 124,392 .30 .043 .11 .38
Product Spillover (share) 124,392 .01 .01 0 .07
Country Spillover (share) 124,392 .09 .06 0 .28
Product - Country Spillover (share) 124,392 .00 .004 0 .042
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Table A.1.1: Non linearities, the shape of spillovers.
baseline 3 neighbors
at least
one neighbor
at least
spilllovers
shape of
linearities
non
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Spillover measures (t-1)
# of (other) same variety importers in the region 0.0504*** 0.0361*** 0.0469***
(0.0020) (0.0023) (0.0021)
Presence (t-1) 0/1
strictly positive 0.1767*** 0.1095***
Presence (t-1) [in brackets]
(0.0136) (0.0140)
one 0.1327***
(0.0144)
two 0.2443***
(0.0193)
three 0.3469***
(0.0235)
four 0.4114***
(0.0274)
five 0.4864***
(0.0312)
six-ten 0.6168***
(0.0298)
above-ten 0.9052***
(0.0401)
# Observations 545988.0000 103917.0000 545988.0000 545988.0000 545988.0000
# triads (firm-product-source) 63886.0000 14105.0000 63886.0000 63886.0000 63886.0000
pseudo R-squared 0.0086 0.0105 0.0080 0.0086 0.0084
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-
product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All
regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit)
industry level-variety level.
Table A.2.1: Employment Area as Region, Main Results
Spillover
General
Spillover
Product
Spillover
Origin
Spillover
Product-Origin
industry
breakdown by
within region
Decay
Spatial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spillover measures (t-1)
Product-Origin Spillover: # other same product-
source importers in the same county
0.0345*** 0.0385*** 0.0366*** 0.0409***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023)
# of other firms importing the same product from a
different source
0.0029** 0.0061***
(0.0010) (0.0010)
# of other firms importing a different product from
the same source
0.0028*** 0.0053***
(0.0004) (0.0003)
# of other firms importing a different product from
a different source
-0.0034***
(0.0004)
# other same product-source importers in the same
county-industry
0.0765*** 0.0572*** 0.0533***
(0.0056) (0.0057) (0.0057)
# other same product-source importers in the same
county but a diff. industry
0.0305*** 0.0138***
(0.0027) (0.0029)
# other same product-source importers in the same
industry but diff. county
0.0458*** 0.0446***
(0.0018) (0.0018)
# other same product-source importers in a diff. in-
dustry and diff. county
0.0035***
(0.0003)
# Observations 486402.0000 486402.0000 486402.0000 486402.0000 486402.0000 486402.0000 618969.0000
# triads (firm-product-source) 58049.0000 58049.0000 58049.0000 58049.0000 58049.0000 58049.0000 68631.0000
pseudo R-squared 0.0202 0.0180 0.0197 0.0179 0.0181 0.0203 0.0106
Fixed effects conditional logit on the decision to take up importing a given intermediate variety.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include year effects, firm-
product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level. All
regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit)
industry level-variety level.
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Table A.3.1: Evidence of spillovers on the imported volume, intensive margin (A)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Spillover measures (t-1)
# other same product-same source importers in the
county
0.0061* 0.0068* 0.0059* 0.0057* 0.0058* 0.0025
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0031)
Firm characteristics (t-1)
ln(size) 0.1101*** 0.1488*** 0.1497*** 0.1490*** 0.1243**
(0.0246) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0257) (0.0429)
ln(avg wage) -0.1228*** -0.0286 -0.0293 -0.0270 -0.0519
(0.0288) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0300) (0.0531)
export status (dest. specific) 0.0322 0.0393 0.0400 0.0389 0.0466
(0.0228) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0408)
BG affil. -0.0560 -0.0274 -0.0246 -0.0243 -0.1203*
(0.0291) (0.0302) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0563)
ln(VA per worker) 0.0810*** 0.0921*** 0.0936*** 0.0947*** 0.0478
(0.0217) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0378)
Variety characteristics (t-1)
priceprodcountry -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0383*
(0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0174)
Industry-Region characteristics (t-1)
# firms county -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002)
ln(county’s ind conc) -0.0323 -0.0337 -0.0980
(0.0264) (0.0265) (0.0594)
ln(Employment Lan) -0.3730 -0.3748 -0.9000*
(0.1946) (0.1949) (0.4494)
Source market characteristics (t-1)
ln(partner GDP) 0.2947* 0.2915
(0.1394) (0.2837)
Int Imports Land -0.0123 0.0029
(0.0477) (0.1083)
# Observations 156,245 156,080 144,754 144,754 144,456 45,121
# triads (firm-product-source) 84,589 84,486 76,345 76,345 76,173 24,987
Adjusted R-squared 0.005 0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007
OLS on the imported volume of a given product-source-market combination. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include firm-product-country fixed effects and
errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level.
A3: Local spillovers on the intensive margin of imports
This paper investigates the existence and nature of local spillovers among importers. Using a unusually detailed
dataset comprising Swedish firms trade transactions (both imports and exports) at the product, firm, and des-
tination country level for 1997?2014, I focus on the impact of the geographical agglomeration of importers on
individual firms’ import decisions (i.e. the extensive margin). In this section I am looking for evidence of lo-
cal spillovers on the other dimension of firms? import performance, namely their import volume (the intensive
margin). Below I replicate Tables 1, and 10.
For the intensive margin, I use the logarithm of the volume of imports, expressed in tons, at the firm-product-
country level. I am using the volume instead of the value to bypass firm-level quality sorting and pricing issues
but also because values are more volatile than volumes for reasons not related to my research question. Also note
that estimation results are conditional on the fact that firms import that particular product-country pair. The
most specific spillover measure, the number of (other) firms in the region importing a particular product-country
pair enters significantly but only at the 10% level. Moreover, note that once I restrict attention to cases of firms
with at least 3 importing neighbors, the spillover measure of interest fails to enter significantly suggesting that
results in previous columns reflect cases for which the number of neighbors is low.
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Table A.3.2: Evidence of spillovers on the imported volume, intensive margin (B)
(baseline)
Spillover
Regional
Spillover
Sectoral
Channels
Industrial
industry
breakdown by
within region
Decay
Spatial
Spillover measures (t-1)
# other same product-same source importers in the
county
0.0058*
(0.0028)
# other same product-same source importers in the
industry
0.0132*** 0.0131***
(0.0020) (0.0021)
# other same product-source importers in the same
county-industry
0.0207** 0.0117
(0.0065) (0.0065)
# other same product-source importers in the same
county but a diff. industry
0.0002 -0.0035
(0.0034) (0.0038)
# other same product-source importers in the same
industry but diff. county
0.0137***
(0.0024)
# other same product-source importers in a diff. in-
dustry and diff. county
0.0003
(0.0006)
Channel variables (t-1)
forward link 0.0221
(0.0119)
backward link -0.0241
(0.0165)
# Observations 144,456 144,456 144,339 144,456 144,456
# idc -( c )-panels 76,173 76,173 76,096 76,173 76,173
Adjusted R-squared 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007
OLS on the imported volume of a given product-source-market combination. Standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions include firm-product-country fixed effects and errors
are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level. All regressions include year effects, firm-product-country fixed
effects and errors are clustered at the county-(2-digit) industry level-variety level.
Below in Table A.3.2 I investigate whether sectoral spillovers operate via the intensive margin of trade, in other
words whether the (log) of the firm-product-country imported volume is affected by the presence of importing
firms in the same sector. Interestingly the sectoral product and country specific spillover measure has a significant
effect on the imported volume. One more firm in the industry importing the product-country pair in question
leads to a 1.32% increase in the imported volume of that variety.
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